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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines a sample o f firms from the 70 largest Korean 
conglomerates, or chaebols, in order to detennine the motivation behind their 
diversification strategies and to identify the effects o f diversification on economic 
performance. The first essay, "Government Revenue Maximization, External Capital 
and Corporate Diversification,” examines the argument that firms that have easy 
access to external capital, which is directly related to government subsidies in Korea, 
become over-diversified. The empirical analysis shows that firms with a high debt 
level are the most likely to pursue diversified expansion. Furthermore, this study 
shows that these firms have a tendency to decrease their diversification level when the 
government reduces business subsidies. The analysis conducted here is consistent 
with the argument that extensive and skewed subsidies lead industrial firms to 
accumulate considerable resources that are a springboard for excessive diversification.
The second essay, entitled, ''''Chaebol Structure and Industry Productivity 
Growth in Korea,” focuses on the effects o f corporate diversification on performance 
rather than any particular aim that lies behind diversification strategies. According to 
prevailing studies, the over-diversification o f Korea's large business conglomerates 
was an important source o f inefficiency, which resulted in an industrial structure that 
was particularly susceptible to the financial shocks o f the 1990s. My empirical tests 
are consistent with this argument, as they show that industries with higher levels o f 
chaebol diversification have lower levels o f  productivity and productivity growth. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies in other countries, which have 
found that diversification is negatively related to economic performance.
I X
Chapter 1. 
Introduction
1.1. Introduction
Theoretical and empirical studies have explored corporate diversification in the 
context o f the evolution o f market structure. These studies have focused on the 
motivation behind various diversification strategies and on the effect o f diversification 
on performance because diversified companies, in general, play a significant role with 
respect to economic activity in many countries.' These studies have suggested that 
corporate diversification is attributable to market power (the market power hypothesis), 
to agency problems (the agency hypothesis), and to underutilized resources (the 
resource hypothesis). These studies will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Studies based on the market power and resource viewpoints propose a positive 
relationship between diversification and performance/value, while other studies, which 
support the agency viewpoint, suggest the opposite. Not surprisingly, empirical studies, 
which have generally focused on the effects o f  corporate diversification on profits and 
firms’ value, have also resulted in mixed conclusions. These studies will also be 
discussed in Chapter 3 in detail.
The above studies, however, have not examined the incentives for, and effects 
o f  corporate diversification when a government extensively intervenes in resource 
allocation in the financial market. It has been argued that government intervention in 
the capital markets in Korea has been particularly important and that it has influenced
' For example, tlie 500 largest US public companies, which increased their level o f  diversification during 
the period from 1985 to 1992, accounted for approximately 75% o f  the output o f  all public companies in 
1992 (Montgomery, 1994). For the roles o f  diversified firms, in detail, in a number o f  countries, see 
Berry ( 1974), Rutnelt (1982), Hubbard and Palia ( 1998) for USA, Caves et al ( 1980) for Canada. Goto 
(1981) for Japan, and Utton (1977) for the United Kingdom.
the industrial structure o f Korea. It has been well documented that large business 
groups in Korea, the chaebols, are highly diversified and relatively large in scale for a 
country the size o f Korea. Korean chaebols, such as Samsung and Hyundai, have 
diversified across a wide range o f industries and have grown rapidly by employing 
diversification strategies. These Korean business chaebols have been found to consist 
of interlocking relationships across a wide variety o f different-sized firms, with the 
larger finns integrating and coordinating the business activities o f the smaller firms.
The large business groups are connected with their affiliated finns through a common 
centralized ownership; they are also often closely connected to the government and 
banks.
The Korean government has been supporting the chaebols through a wide range 
of economic policies that have included initiatives such as low-interest loans, import 
licenses, large-scale tax benefits, and export subsidies. These policies helped the 
chaebols to grow faster than other businesses in Korea during the high-growth period. 
However, in spite o f  their fast growth, some o f the largest groups went bankrupt and 
rocked the Korean economy before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It has been 
argued that the chaebols with high debt were ‘over’ diversified, and that they played a 
very important role in causing the crisis (e.g., Krueger and Yoo, 2001 ; Joh, 2001). The 
received wisdom is that government intervention in the financial market led chaebols to 
become overly diversified, which resulted, in turn, in poor economic performance by 
the chaebols. Furthennore, mounting government intervention has created crony 
capitalism between the chaebols and the government, which has, in turn, weakened the
financial and banking system. As a result, the large financial resources that have been 
diverted to the chaebols have become a source o f inefficiency for the Korean economy.
The above studies have, however, attempted to identify the motivation for the 
over-diversification o f  the chaebols without a well-speeified theoretical and empirical 
model. In this dissertation, I suggest a testable theoretical model that eneompasses the 
idea o f incentives for chaebol diversification. This constitutes a departure from other 
empirical studies. Moreover, the analysis here is not limited to identifying the 
motivation for over-diversification on the part o f the chaebols', it also investigates the 
effects o f diversification on performance. Empirical studies investigating corporate 
diversification have measured performance in terms o f invested capital, Tobin’s q, and 
concentration ratio, rather than productivity. One signifieant feature o f this study is that 
it empirically investigates the relationship between diversifieation and productivity.
1.2. Objectives of the Study
This study will examine the diversification behavior o f  chaebols and investigate 
the effects o f diversification on performance. In partieular, this study will address the 
following questions;
(1) Why do Korean conglomerates opt for a business structure that emphasizes 
excessive diversification as opposed to a more specialized structure?
(2) What role does the Korean government play in the diversification process o f 
chaebols!
(3) What impact does chaebol diversification have on industry perfonnance?
1.3. Results of the Study
The fourth chapter o f this dissertation proposes a testable theoretical model by 
which corporate diversification may be examined. The model deals with excessive 
financial resources as a reason for corporate diversification, which is related, in turn, to 
non-market allocation o f resources from the government. In other words, with limited 
capital available, the Korean government allocates capital to a limited number of 
chaebols in order to maximize national output. Given allocated external capital, 
chaebols then choose a number o f individual divisions to minimize total costs. Under 
the assumption that the cost function o f divisions is U-shaped, as the amount o f external 
capital increases, the chaebols will become more diversified. This model is examined 
empirically by analyzing microeconomic data from the 70 largest business groups in 
Korea between 1986 and 2000. This empirical analysis finds that Korean 
conglomerates became more diversified if  (i) the amount o f external financing 
increased; (ii) the difference between the market capital price and business loan interest 
rates became larger; and/or (iii) their financial costs o f  external debt burden decreased. 
Furthennore, when reforms reducing government subsidies were introduced after the 
1997 crisis, chaebols became less diversified. These results are in agreement with the 
view that chaebols diversification is substantially associated with their excessive use of 
external capital. When the external capital price for corporate funds was lower, the 
chaebols tended to become larger and diversified. In addition, the chaebols curbed their 
level of diversification after the 1997 financial crisis, when the government reduced 
business subsidies. These findings suggest that the government played an important 
role in the process o f chaebol diversification.
The fifth chapter of this dissertation looks at how the structure o f the 70 largest 
Korean conglomerates influenced industry performance. In order to investigate the 
effects o f chaebols on industry performance, data on chaebol diversification are 
combined with data on industry productivity. This part o f the study concentrates on the 
hypothesis that diversification o f the chaebols has a negative impact on industry 
performance. To investigate this claim, 1 directly investigate the relationship between 
chaebol diversification and industry performance. 1 find that higher levels o f chaebol 
diversification are associated with lower levels of industry performance.
1.4. Organization of the Study
The remainder o f this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
summary o f the chaebols in the Korean economy. In Chapter 3, the previous theoretical 
and empirical literature pertaining to corporate diversification is briefly reviewed. 
Chapter 4 presents the first essay, “Government Revenue Maximization, External 
Capital and Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Korea.” In Chapter 5, the 
second essay presents ''^Chaebol Structure and Industry Productivity Growth in Korea.” 
Chapter 6 draws summary and concluding discussions.
Chapter 2. 
The Background of Chaebols in the Korean Economy 
2.1. Introduction
This chapter briefly examines the emergence, development, and the 
characteristics o f  chaebols in Korea based on previous studies. Many studies have 
discussed chaebol structure, behavior, and organization. Section 2.2 describes the 
origins and development o f chaebols. Section 2.3 outlines the characteristics o f the 
chaebols.
2.2. The Origins and Development of Chaebols
One of the most unique features o f industrial organization in Korea is the 
existence o f large business groups called chaebols? Literally, a chaebol can be defined 
as ‘a financial faction’ or ‘a financial group’. However, most Korean people use the 
term as ‘large private enterprises’ or ‘the entrepreneurs’ managing giant private finns.^ 
For the purpose o f this study, chaebols are defined as extremely large conglomerates, 
officially independent, and multi-diversified firms, which are owned and controlled by 
either one or two families’ direct ownership.
Although major industrial programs in Korea did not begin until the early 1960s, 
the origins o f the country’s entrepreneurial elite are found in the political economy o f 
thel950s. Very few Koreans owned or managed large corporations during the Japanese 
colonial period. After the independence from Japan in 1945, some Korean businessmen 
took over the existing Japanese finns and these finns grew into the chaebols o f today 
(Fields, 1995).
■ I also use large business groups or large business conglomerate groups or enterprises interchangeably. 
Sometimes a cluiehol means entrepreneurial elite, big entrepreneur, or most successful capitalist.
Chaebols grew markedly in the 1960s. The tremendous rise and growth of the 
chaebol, beginning in the early 1960s, was closely linked to the expansion o f Korean 
exports. This growth resulted from the diversification o f production. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s, the chaebols concentrated on textile industries where low wage rates 
offered a competitive advantage; by the mid-1970s, and 1980s, the chaebols diversified 
into heavier industries including steel, machinery, defense, and chemicals — benefiting 
from government subsidies. In the 1990s, the growth accelerated into electronics and 
high technology industries and was fueled by an explosive growth in exports, often with 
the help o f  government export promotion programs. As the Korean economy expanded, 
the chaebols also began to produce for the growing domestic market (Yoo and Lee, 
1987; Kang, 2000).
The chaebol is a very important organization in the Korean economy. The 
largest 30 chaebols accounted for 31.1%, 40.7%, 37.3%, 39.7%, and 40.7% o f total 
output and for 20.5%, 18.6%, 17.6%, 17.5% and 18% o f employment in 1977, 1982,
1987, 1992, and 1995, respectively (Smith, 2000).
2.3. Characteristics of Chaebols
Large business groups are not limited to Korea but are commonly found in many 
countries. Korean chaebols are similar in some respects to Japanese Keiretsu.
However, one important difference is they do not own and control banks because the 
government owned commercial banks until the early 1980s. According to the law, 
industrial finns were not allowed to own large shares in banks even after privatization 
o f the banks. Moreover, the chaebols are more diversified, more centralized, and much 
more family based than keiretsu (Lin, Choi, & Wang, 1998; Hattori, 1989).
In the process o f economic development, the chaebols have shown enormous 
growth in size, giving birth to a unique business and industrial structure. Member finns 
o f a chaebol are centrally controlled in their administrative and financial activity 
through mutual shareholding or ownership by a limited number o f families. In addition, 
chaebols strive to have a strong vertical integration and multi-diversification across 
industries including manufacturing, service, trade, and finance. The larger business 
groups are more diversified than smaller ones (Lee, 1992; Hattori, 1989; Gul & Kealey,
1999). In addition, chaebols have developed strong relationships with government and 
banking institutions.
2.4. Conclusion
I presented briefly the backgrounds o f chaebols in the Korean Economy. This 
chapter depicted the Korean chaebols as very large and diversified firms in a wide range 
of industries. They are strongly related to the government and banks. In addition, the 
origins, development, and behavior o f chaebols are greatly influenced by government 
policies.
Chapter 3. 
Review of the Diversification Literature 
3.1. Introduction
Many economists have studied corporate diversification in industries. This 
review will examine why firms diversify and present a review o f the empirical evidence 
on the effects o f corporate diversification on firm performance. There are three 
comprehensive perspectives on why firms diversify, as Montgomery (1994) describes: 
the market power view, the resource view, and the agency view. Previous studies 
suggest that diversification can either enhance value/performance or reduce 
value/performance. The market and the resource views generally predict that 
diversification has value-enhancing effects consistent with profit maximization. The 
agency view suggests a negative relationship between diversification and firm 
value/performance. Section 3.2 describes the theoretical views on diversification. 
Section 3.3 examines the empirical literature on diversification effects.
3.2. Theoretical Views on Diversification 
Market Power View
Traditionally, diversification has been regarded as a survival strategy against 
specialized rivals, or as a way of deflecting potential threats (Shubik, 1959; Gribbin, 
1976; Caves, 1981; Hill, 1983,1985; Encauaet al., 1986; Bemhcim and Whinston,
1990). From this perspective, large business firms diversify to augment their market 
power, the idea being that the diversification-seeking firm must obtain enough market 
power in an individual market to be able to exploit, extend, and defend its existing 
market share from existing and potential competition. Such aggregative efforts by a
group of firms would result in emergent business opportunities, lower competition, and 
higher industrial concentration. Most diversified firms develop market power through 
cross-subsidization across industries or product markets. Market power in one industry 
allows dominance in other industries through cross-subsidization. For example, large 
and diversified firms with existing market power in one industry can support predatory 
pricing strategies in another industry by using the profits earned in one market to 
subsidize below cost pricing in another market (Rhoades, 1973). Successive predation 
in one market also contributes to establishing a reputation, and this, in turn, reduces the 
costs o f predation in other markets (multimarket reputation). The multimarket contract 
hypothesis offers another perspective on the most effective way to increase market 
power (Seott, 1993; Bemhein and Whinston, 1990). In this hypothesis, an active firm in 
several markets has a partieular incentive to devise and sustain collusive agreements 
with major players o f other industries. As a result, a new, large business group is 
created. This view supports the idea that diversification enhances business 
performance. That said, there are a number o f scholars, who are opposed to theory- 
driven research and base their research on empirical studies. These studies have 
stressed that market power is not a motivating factor with respect to diversifieation but, 
rather, that it is its consequence or by-product o f  diversification (Montgomery, 1994; 
Vannoni, 2000b).
Resource View
The resource approach provides another perspective on diversification. Based 
on the study o f Penrose ( 1959), this approach emphasizes the efficient use o f resources. 
This view has been supported by Teeee (1980, 1982), Nelson and Winter (1982),
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Wemerfelt ( 1988), Caves ( 1982), and Lippman and Rumelt ( 1982). According to these 
scholars, firms diversify in response to the existence o f excess capacity in productive 
factors and I ess-than perfectly marketable resources, when the finu reaches the 
minimum efficient scale."^ In other words, a firm has an incentive to expand as long as 
it can operate profitably and this expansion may involve diversification (e.g., R&D and 
advertising investment, labor and managerial skills, and know-how). For example, 
when a firm is confronted with an obstacle, such as the presence o f transaction costs, or 
contractual problems involved in the purchase or sale o f  intangible assets, it takes the 
option o f internalizing resources, rather than transferring them across firms.
In addition to scale issues, diversification may also depend on the specificity or 
generality o f  the firm’s resources, which, again, depend on the degree o f  transferability 
o f  those resources. In other words, less specific resources (e.g., a widely-recognized 
brand name or standard-issue milling machines) may be transferred or applied with ease 
to a number o f different industries, and thus provide firms with a basis for 
diversification.^ Thus, each diversified firm has a different level o f diversification, and 
this level is dependent on the nature o f the firm's resources.
Agency View
The agency view, the last approach to be examined here, explains diversification 
as the outgrowth o f managers' pursuit o f their own interests at the expense o f their 
firm’s owners (Jensen, 1986; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1991). In this model, firms are run by managers and owned by shareholders 
who are too dispersed to enforce value or profit maximization. Managers tend to pursue
See Penrose (1959, p. 68) in detail.
 ^ See W illiamson (1975), Klein et al. (1978),and Grossman & Hart (1986) in detail.
diversification strategies to maximize their own objectives, such as personal power or 
compensation, by increasing firm size. Due to an information advantage, the managers 
can maximize their own objectives by utilizing cash generated by the firm to diversify, 
rather than paying it back directly to shareholders. As firms expand beyond the profit 
maximizing level, managers can increase the demand for their knowledge and 
specialties. This managerial behavior may strengthen their personal power and lead to 
an increase in personal compensation. Thus, a firm may be well diversified with respect 
to overall risk, but it may also face the increased and excessive managerial costs 
associated with the management o f large and complex group finns. This perspective 
foresees a negative relationship between diversification and a firm’s performance.
3.3. Empirical Studies of Diversification Effects
Most empirical research has focused on how corporate diversification affects 
firm performance. Firm performance, in terms o f concentration, industry growth, 
industry retum-to-scale, or Tobin’s q (firm value), has generally been measured by 
accounting indices such as stock return and return on invested capital. The Herfindahl 
index has been used to measure diversification in most empirical studies. The empirical 
literature has generally found mixed results regarding the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance. A majority o f studies have found a negative 
relationship between diversification and firm performance (Rhoades, 1974; Utton,
1977; Montgomery, 1985; Palepu, 1985; Beger and Ofek, 1995). Comment and Jarrell 
(1994) found a decrease in abnonnal stock returns due to diversification. Similarly,
Lang and Stulz (1994) presented evidence o f a negative relationship between firm value 
(Tobin’s q) and diversification. Berry (1974) and Caves (1981 ) found little definitive
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empirical evidence on the relationship between diversifieation and firm value. 
Furthermore, Berry found that growing firms tend to diversify.
Some studies, though, have found a positive relationship between diversifieation 
and firm performance (e.g., Feinberg, 1985; Seott, 1982). Classifying diversified firms 
into nine categories, Rumelt (1982) found that the firms that diversified into related 
industries could increase value to a greater extent than firms which are pursuing 
specialization or unrelated diversifieation. Rapidly growing firms with signifieant 
marketing and R&D resources were the most likely to pursue diversified expansion. In 
the process o f diversification, these firms tended to enter markets where the resource 
requirements were similar to their current capabilities at the firm and industry level 
(Lemelin, 1982; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).
Recent studies show that diversifieation may reduce firm value/performance 
compared with specialized or less diversified firm counterparts (Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996; Lament and Polk, 2000). A growing literature 
has focused on why diversifieation might decrease firm value and cause poor 
performance. Some studies argue that the poor performance results from the inefficient 
distribution o f resources based on cross-subsidization. This will occur when the firm 
invests relatively too much in the sectors o f lower returns or poor performance and too 
little in the more profitable sectors (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Seharfstein and Stein, 1997; 
Rajan, Sevaes, and Zingales, 2000; Chevalier, 1999).
One study o f Korean finns, Chang and Choi (1988), examined the 
diversification strategy and finn perfonnance from a transaction cost approach. They 
found that large business groups tend to diversify to avoid higher transaction costs and
13
business groups with multidivisional structures are much superior in economic 
performance to independent firms. Similarly, examining Korean firms, Jeong and 
Masson (1990) found that their results strongly support the market power hypothesis.
In case o f  Japanese firms, Goto (1981) showed that a small number o f very large, highly 
diversified firms dominate the Japanese economy. Caves and Uekusa (1976) showed 
that the group-affiliated firms have lower profits than those o f non-group finns in Japan. 
However, Itami et al. (1982) divided the diversified finns into seven strategy types, 
from single business to unrelated business, and found a positive relationship between 
related diversification and profits and growth. In a study o f Taiwanese industries, Aw 
and Batra (1998) found that diversification tends to be solely a large finn phenomenon. 
Among small and medium firms, the most eommon form o f diversification consists o f 
diversifying into a different geographical market. The positive relation between firm 
size and produet diversification is limited to large exporting firms in Taiwan.
3.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I described briefly some theoretical hypotheses regarding 
corporate diversification. Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification is 
motivated by market power, efficient allocation o f resources, and the agency problem. 
Empirical studies provide evidence that corporate diversification has two effects: 
perfonnance/value enhancing or performance/value reducing effects according to the 
specific motivations for diversification.
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Chapter 4.
Government Revenue Maximization, External Capital and Corporate 
Diversification: Evidence from Korea
4.1. Introduction
This chapter develops a theoretical model to generate testable implications 
regarding incentives for corporate diversification in cases where a firm has excessive 
financial resources as a result o f government intervention in financial markets. This 
kind o f situation may lead firms to overdiversify. I provide empirical evidence based 
on data on the 70 largest Korean business conglomerates. Over the past several 
decades, many theoretical and empirical studies have offered a number o f reasons as to 
why a firm may choose to overdiversify. In their discussion o f the agency view, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that when firms perform poorly and experience lower 
growth opportunities in their current activities, managers pursue their own interests at 
the expense o f firms’ shareholders, and may attempt to accumulate resources and use 
them to diversify. By diversifying beyond the profit maximizing level, managers can 
maximize their power, prestige, or compensation by increasing the firm's demand for 
their managerial skills or knowledge. This approach emphasizes the managers' benefits 
rather than firm performance or efficiency and, thus, may be used to predict a negative 
relationship between diversification and firm performance/value due to the increased, 
and sometimes excessive, managerial costs associated with the management o f large 
and complex group finns. Teece ( 1980, 1982), Amihud and Lev (1981), and Wemerfelt 
and Montgomery (1988) have supported this perspective.
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Overdiversification may also be driven by capital market imperfections. 
Empirical studies have looked at why industrial U.S. firms diversified during the 1960s 
and 1970s and then refocused their core divisions or segments in the 1980s (e.g., Lang 
and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996). Markids (1995) has interpreted this phenomenon as a 
return to core activities from the overdiversification o f the 1960s and 1970s, a situation 
that could have been due to the less-developed capital markets that existed at that time. 
When capital markets are less developed, diversified finns take advantage o f internal 
and external markets. Hubbard and Palia (1998) emphasized that “diversified (U.S.) 
firms were perceived ex ante by the external capital markets to have an informational 
advantage” (p.2), and Bhide (1990) has pointed out that “the diversified (U.S.) 
corporation can perform the role o f banker, channeling cash from units with excess cash 
to those requiring funds ” (p.74). In other words, large diversified firms, operating 
across unrelated markets, can produce large amounts o f cash by employing centralized 
resource management. Consequently, large diversified firms have an incentive to 
invest funds in additional risky projects, in various different, even unrelated, areas. 
These projects, which would not otherwise be considered as investment projects, are 
initiated through internal capital markets, but are operated without scrutiny from outside 
investors. In addition, in a situation in which capital markets are relatively less 
developed, the value of diversified finns may be overestimated, creating another 
incentive for overdiversification. Hubbard and Palia (1998) provided evidence that 
merging finns in the 1960s in the U.S., which was a time when well-developed external 
capital markets did not exist, fonned their own internal capital markets. Bidding finns 
in mergers earned abnormal returns on acquisition announcements. As a result, under
these circumstances, diversified finns enhanced their value. However, significant 
improvements in capital markets have facilitated the monitoring o f corporate 
performance, and the allocation o f resources, and this has led firms to refocus on their 
core business activities. Markids (1995) provided evidence that widely diversified U.S. 
finns largely eliminated their activities in marginal and unrelated sectors during the 
1980s, when capital markets became more developed. Diversified firms, therefore, are 
less valuable business entities when capital markets are more sophisticated, and in this 
situation they return to their optimal level o f diversification.*"
The perspectives on diversification mentioned above, however, have rarely 
investigated incentives for diversification, and the effects o f corporate diversification, 
when a government significantly intervenes in the reallocation o f resources. This has 
been the situation in Korea. It may be that government policies to maximize national 
output encourage diversification through the mechanism by which government allocates 
capital. The skewed and concessionary financial resources that are provided by the 
government for certain specific or new industries might induce firms to diversify. 
Suppose the government allocates capital by setting up low-interest loans to encourage 
finns to invest in specific new sectors, such as in the leading technology industries. In 
this case firms, especially the chaebols that have an edge with respect to market 
experience, size, and/or performance, can obtain substantial access to government 
allocated resources, at low costs, and they can utilize these resources as a basis for 
diversification.
Markid suggested that there is an optimal level o f  corporate diversification, which depends on firms' 
managerial capacities, specific assets, and economic environment.
17
Current research has focused on the role o f the Korean government in promoting 
chaebol diversification. It is argued that the resulting ‘overdiversification’ led to 
inefficiency and, in part, to the Asian financial crisis in Korea (e.g., Krueger & Woo, 
2001 ; Joh, 2001 ; Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2002). Krueger and Woo (2001), for example, 
pointed out that government policies encouraged chaebols to diversify beyond the 
efficient level. Overdiversification on the part o f the chaebols played a major part both 
in creating the crisis in 1997 and in intensifying its severity. Furthermore, they argued 
that this intervention constituted a weakness in the banking system that led to other 
elements o f  crony capitalism. In order to confirm some o f these hypotheses, this 
chapter provides a theoretical framework for empirical research that relates incentives 
for corporate diversification to the influence o f government policies. The idea is that a 
fixed resource endowment leads the government to allocate resources to a limited 
number o f  firms in order to increase output. Once the capital allocation level has been 
set, firms choose the number o f  divisions they will undertake in order to minimize their 
total costs. Under the assumption o f a standard U-shaped cost function, as external 
capital allocated increases, firms tend to diversify.
The model is examined empirically by using a microeconomic dataset, 
composed o f  data from the 70 largest Korean conglomerates, or chaebols, for the 
sample period 1986-2000. The empirical analysis finds that, with respect to 
subsidization, Korean conglomerates become larger and more diversified as the amount 
o f external capital (debt) they use increases (holding chaebol size constant). The 
analysis also reports that as the difference between the market capital price (defined as 
the average curb market interest rates) and external capital price for corporate fimds
become larger, the Korean chaebols become more diversified. Finally, it shows that 
chaebols with lower financial costs o f external debt have higher levels of 
diversification. In addition, our results show that when the government subsidies were 
reduced following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the chaebols became less diversified. 
Thus, the results o f our analysis are consistent with the view that chaebol diversification 
are related directly to the excessive supply o f capital.
The rest o f this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 develops the 
theoretical model; Section 4.3 describes the data; Section 4.4 reports the empirical 
analysis based on the proposed theoretical model at the conglomerate level; and Section 
4.5 provides a summary and concluding comments.
4.2. The Theoretical Model
In this section, I propose a two-stage model between government and industrial 
firms based on the case o f  Korea. Under limited resource endowment, the government 
plays a role in allocating resources to industrial firms to maximize the national output 
level. However, due to resource restrictions, the government may not allocate capital 
(i.e., resources) to all firms in industries equally. In the first stage, the government 
decides how much capital to allocate, which detennines the output level in the 
economy, and then selects specific industrial firms to fulfill the target in the markets.
The government charges a capital price to selected finns below the market price. In the 
second stage, given the output level, a finn decides the level o f diversification to 
minimize total cost.
For simplicity, nonnalizing product prices, i.e., /? = 1, the revenue is the same 
as output because product price is determined by the world market so the price is
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exogenous in Korea, which is a small economy. The output 0  o f a finn is a function of 
capital usage by the finn. Q = G{Jk) where Tk represents total capital usage by the 
firm. Total capital by the firm is the sum o f external capital usage and internal capital 
usage. That is, Tk = k + i k , where k  represents external capital usage by the finn and ik 
represents internal capital usage by the firm, respectively. In this model, external 
capital is provided by the government while internal capital refers to all other sources o f 
capital. Assuming that k and ik are in fixed proportion, so that ik = A k . Therefore,
Tk = k + ik = k + Ak = {A + 1)A. Now the production function o f the firm can be 
written as Q = G((A + ])k) and we denote G((A + 1)&) as F ( k ) . I assume F(kJ is 
monotonie and concave. For the given output, firms choose the number o f divisions in 
order to minimize total costs.
4.2.1. Revenue Maximization Behavior
I consider two kind o f behavior: one is the government’s revenue maximization 
when it allocates fixed capital to a limited number o f  firms and the other is a firm (or 
chaebol)'s problem to choose the number o f divisions to minimize its cost function 
given allocated external capital.
A. Government’s Revenue Maximization
Let the total capital available be fixed K  for the government. There are m finns 
selected by the government and each finn j  has the capital output relation Oj = F{kj ) .
Consider the benchmark model in which the government maximizes total output (GDP) 
subjected to the resource constraint as follows: The government usually does not treat 
all finns equally. There are several reasons: (i) the political economy reason, i.e., the 
government will give more weight to finns who spend more money on lobbying or are
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politically more important although economically equivalent; (ii) the information 
reason, the government will give more weight to firms whom they trust more; and (iii) 
the development strategy reason, even if  the revenue is the same, the government may 
put more weight on some sectors, like leading technology industries. Let the weight o f 
each firm be 9j . The government’s problem becomes:
(4.1) Max.
y=i
(4.2) Subject to ^  kj  = K
The Lagrangian function o f the above problem is:
m m
(4.3) L = ^ e , F , ( k i ) + r ( K - % k , )
y=i y=i
where y represents the shadow price o f the capital. Note that y may not be equal to the 
capital price that the firm has to pay to the government. In the Korean case, the capital 
price that the government charges to selected firms is much below the market price and 
has even been negative for a long period o f  time during the industrialization period.
The government artificially sets interest rates fixed at a low level for loans to industrial 
firms and the only restraint is that the eapital price that the government charges are no 
lower than interest rates for savings (Joh, 2001). The first order condition o f the above 
Lagrangian function gives:
dFj{k. )  _ y
(4.4a)
dkj 9j
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Because F ^(kj)is  concave, the larger is, the more A',, will be. If 6,. = 1,
dkj
-  Y and kj  is efficient in the sense that it maximizes GDP; if Oj < \ , the firm
cannot get enough capital to operate efficiently; i f  0j > \ ,  the firm has more eapital than 
the efficient level. I foeus on the last case that most closely fits the case o f chaebols. 
Assume that a chaebol has the weight 9j > 1 and let the solution to (4.4a) be Aj . The
assumption that Fj{kj ) i s  concave implies that k'j > k*. The output o f firm J  is then
detennined by Qj  = F j ( k j ) .
B. The Firm’s Problem
Let n be the number o f sectors the firm operates. Let be the output the firm 
produces in sector / for i = 1,2,..., « . The variable cost function o f division i is denoted 
as c(qj) and identical across all divisions. Note that labor, external eapital, internal 
capital, and other factors are used to produce g ,. The variable cost o f  producing is 
some composition o f  these factor values. 1 assume c(g% ) is a standard U shape cost 
function (concave).
The fixed cost for each sector is denoted as /'and identical across all sectors. 1 
assume / ’is the investment cost and the investment o f each division is assumed to be a 
constant I. The investment consists o f internal capital and external capital. Therefore, 
the price o f a unit o f investment is some composition o f internal and external capital 
prices. 1 assume that this unit price o f investment is proportional to the external eapital 
price; that is,
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where y  is the price o f external capital and 8  is the ratio o f the unit price o f the 
investment to the price o f external capital. The assumption that cost functions across all 
the sectors are identical implies that
1^ =^2  =  - = 9 » =9  
Thus, the total cost function for the firm is;
(4.5) TC = n{c{q) + 8yI]
The firm’s total output is equal to Q = n q . Note that the unit of the product in each 
sector is normalized such that the prices o f  all sectors are equal to one. The firm
chooses n and q to minimize the total cost for Q = F(ki )  which is determined by the 
external eapital. Hence, the finn’s problem is:
(4.6) Min. rC  = «[c(^) + / ]
subject to Q = nq
Substituting the constraint Q = nq into the total cost function, the above problem 
becomes
Min TC = Ç) M i l l / I
q
which is equivalent to
(4.7) Min =
q
That is the standard problem of minimizing average cost. The first order condition 
gives:
(4.8) =
q
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In other words, the average cost o f sector AC is minimized when the AC curve 
intercepts the marginal cost curve MC = c \ q ) . Let q* be the solution o f (4.8). Then 
the optimal number o f sector is:
(4.9) n * = 4
The finn’s diversification is measured by
(4.10) D  = l - g ( % ' = l — L  = I - &M g M g
(4.11) = 1 -  9
F(A)
Therefore, the proposition follows:
Proposition 4.1. As the firm's size Q or external capital increases, n increases and 
the firm becomes more diversified.
C. The Effect of Low External Capital Price
Let’s assume the government’s subsidization reduces the external capital price 
y , a low external capital price is obtained. Let y* and .4C*be the price and average 
cost with government subsidization, / "  and AC" be the price and average cost without 
government subsidization, and < y" . Therefore, if  a reform calls to remove the 
government’s subsidization on the firm, the firm’s average cost curve after refonn in 
each sector AC shifts up. Thus, 17* is increased and n is reduced, which is shown in 
Figure 4.1.
Proposition 4.2. If a reform removes the subsidization to the firm, the firm becomes 
less diversified after the reform.
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4.2.2. Static Comparison
Let c{q) - a q ^ . The total cost function in each sector is;
C{q) = aq~ +SyI
where parameter a measures the production efficiency o f the firm. A firm is more 
efficient when a is smaller. To solve for q* have:
MC = AC **
a
and
q ôyl Syl
which can be summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. I f  the firm ’s average investment in each division is lower, the price o f  
external capital is lower, the firm is less efficient in production, the size o f the firm is 
larger, or the firm ’s external capital usage is larger, then the firm becomes more 
diversified.
Now consider that two same size firms compete in a perfect competitive market 
that is open to all countries, implying that the market price is equal to world market 
price. I use subscripts 1 and 2 to represent the variables o f  finns 1 and 2. Firm 1 is less 
efficient than finn 2, but finn 1 is subsidized by the government. Under the assumption
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of perfect competition, the firms’ profits are zero and thus, 
p  — MC| = MCj = AC ^ = AC 2-
Let 7 , < y 2 and a^  > a , . Hence, firm 1 has lower external capital price and is 
less efficient in production than firm 2. It is shown in Figure 4.2 that ql < q \ , which 
implies that firm 1 is more diversified than firm 2 .
This theoretical model sets out a reason that explains why chaebols generally 
chose a highly diversified business structure. In Korea, the government has played an 
important role in the chaebol diversification process, as it has allocated limited financial 
resources favorably to the chaebols, in a situation in which financial resources were 
limited. Given allocated capital, concessionary capital increases, and chaebols tend to 
diversify. The remaining sections o f  this chapter explore empirically this possibility.
4.3. Data
The data set relates to the 70 largest business groups, chaebols, operating in the 
Korean economy between 1986 and 2000. The datasets o f the Korean Economic 
Research Institute (KERl), National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), and LG 
Securities (LG) are used in this analysis. The KERl dataset contains information on the 
70 chaebols and non-chaebol finns since 1986, though there is limited financial 
infonnation. The dataset has an advantage o f identifying 70 chaebols and their 
affiliated firms. The affiliated finns o f chaebols are identified as finns that are under 
the same ownership or under the control o f a single business group. The missing data 
and infonnation are augmented by the datasets o f NICE and LG.^ Diversification is
’ The three .state-owned business groups are excluded.
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defined according to each chaebols’ activity in more than one industry at the two-digit 
Korean Standard Industry Classification (SIC) level.
As seen in Table 4.1, the 70 chaebols that were in operation during the sample 
period have 1,494 affiliated firms. Firms having primary SIC codes in finance or 
banking (SIC 65-69) are regulated; they either have a different financial structure (e.g., 
no sales), or they do not report information. As these factors make comparisons 
difficult, these firms were excluded from this study. In addition, with this elimination, 
some chaebols have only one or two affiliated firms that tend to be marginal firms in 
the non-finance and banking industry that are within the same chaebol. When these 
chaebol firms are included in the sample, they seem to be quite specialized. As this 
factor also makes comparison difficult, these firms are not considered with respect to 
the analysis. After eliminating the 157 observations o f financial and banking firms and 
these marginal firms, the number o f affiliated firms o f chaebols is 1,337 during the 
sample period. Without financial and banking finns, on average, each chaebol has 19 
affiliated firms and engages in six or seven different two-digit industries for each 
sample year.
Even with the additional data from NICE and LG datasets, 160 chaebol-f\rms 
still have missing data. These observations are again deleted from the sample. In 
analyzing the chaebol diversification, 1,177 firms have complete infonnation for the 
sample period. The average number o f affiliated finns and engaged industries o f each 
chaebol are 16.81 and 5.57 at the 2-digit SIC level, respectively.
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4.4. Empirical Analysis
4.4.1. The Empirical Model
Based on the results from proposition 4 .3 ,1 formulate a simple empirical model 
to test whether Korean diversification patterns agree with the predictions o f  the model. 
Overall, the empirical analysis will look at how financial factors, and in particular, the 
use o f  external capital influences diversification. The specific measures used in the 
analysis are detailed below. However, the ultimate objective is to see whether chaebols 
that rely on a greater proportion o f external capital provided by the government and 
have lower financing costs are more likely to be diversified. Admittedly, these are 
indirect tests o f the hypothesis that government policy has led to increased 
diversification. The data I have assembled cannot be used to directly analyze the 
interaction between the government and individual chaebols. That said, however, I can 
examine the relationship between interest rate differentials, the cost o f  capital, and the 
use o f debt and chaebol diversification. This should shed light on the role o f  external 
capital in the diversification process.
1 consider several factors that are thought to have influenced the diversification 
of Korean chaebols. First, I look at whether chaebol diversification behavior is 
correlated with financial factors; this is associated with government financial policies 
for allocating capital in Korea. Krueger and Yoo (2001 ) argued that government 
financial policies encouraged crony capitalism, as exemplified by the close relationship 
between the chaebols, the government, and the banks, and further weakened the 
banking system in the period before the Asian financial crisis o f 1997. These factors 
helped the chaebols to achieve high levels o f debt, which may have led, in turn, to
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diversification that was beyond their capacities. This weakness has been identified as 
one o f the possible factors that led directly to the 1997 crisis and intensified its severity. 
For example, in the preceding recession, the government intervened in the financial 
markets in which the chaebols directly participated. These interventions included 
interest rate cuts, an increased supply o f  facility investment funds, and the early 
implementation o f government projects. As a result o f direct government involvement, 
the chaebols were motivated to increase capacity. However, in such a context, the 
incentive for banks to operate with due diligence with respect to a monitoring function 
is weak. In addition, there is an unwillingness to force corporate bankruptcies, as well 
as the existence o f outright corruption. These government interventions directly 
distorted the distribution o f resources and allowed chaebols to raise unprecedented 
amounts o f capital investment in the period 1994-1996 (Haggard and Mo, 2000). As a 
result o f government intervention in the allocation o f capital, chaebols were able to 
access large amounts o f external capital at a relatively low cost, which meant that 
chaebols were given the financial resources to expand and diversify. Thus, one might 
expect that an increase in chaebol debt raise the level o f diversification. This would 
also be consistent with the argument that corporate diversification is positively 
correlated with the excessive usage o f external capital supported by a subsidized price 
o f that capital.
Next, 1 test the hypothesis that industrial firms became less diversified after the 
1997 crisis, in that certain reforms put a stop to the govemment subsidization o f 
industrial firms. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Korean govemment 
implemented refonns that reduced subsidization to firms, forcing chaebols and non­
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chaebol finns to cut down on those affiliated finns that were inefficient. These refonns 
resulted in a reduction, on the part o f the chaebols, in their degree o f diversification.
In order to investigate impacts o f these factors on corporate diversification, the 
following regression model is estimated based on proposition 4.3:
(4.12) D,., = a, + a, In A s s e t F C ^ ,  + a, Dummy, + e,,
Asset.,
where a,, is the chaebol fixed effeets for chaebol i and e, is the error term in time t.
I examine two dependent variables for D, which measure chaebol 
diversifieation: the Herfindahl Index (Div) and the log o f  segment number (InSeg). The 
Herfindahl Index incorporates information on the size distribution, as expressed by the 
square o f  the share o f  the i"' produet (or firm) in total sales, in chaebol c, as follows:
where s is the share o f  the produet. This index is sensitive to the number and 
distribution o f  produets and is defined from zero to one.* The value o f the index 
becomes zero i f  a chaebol produces one produet and increases as a chaebol increases 
the number o f  produets that it produces. Alternatively, I measure the log o f the number 
o f segments (InSeg) a chaebol operates in each year at the two-digit SIC level. This 
index gives us a simple measure o f corporate diversification. The larger the index 
value, the greater the level o f a chaebol’s diversification.
The independent variables include controls for the characteristics o f chaebols, 
the role o f  govemment intervention in the market, and the role o f  reform. With respect 
to the characteristics o f chaebols, chaebol size is controlled for by the log o f total assets
 ^This index has been used to measure diversification in most empirical studies (e.g., Schoar ,2000; Lang 
and Stulz, 1994).
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o f each chaebol ( In Asset ). Clearly, as chaebol size increases we would expect 
chaebols to become more diversified. Table 4.2 shows that overall chaebol size is 
strongly correlated with chaebol debt. In order to control for access to external capital,
1 use the ratio o f debt to assets (-— - ^  ) for a chaebol. If chaebols are beneficiaries o f
Asset j,
govemment support, which includes low interest loans, chaebols are more likely to 
increase debt levels and to use external capital as a source o f financing. Thus, one 
might expeet chaebols with high ratios o f debt to assets to be more diversified. It is also 
possible, however, that chaebols with high debt levels are in financial distress and that 
these chaebols are unlikely to diversify. Finally, systematic differences in the level o f 
diversification due to such factors as difference in managerial efficiencies are controlled 
for by chaebol fixed effects.
In Korea, it has been argued that govemment policies with respect to the 
allocation o f capital constituted the most important factor leading to the creation of 
large and highly diversified chaebols. The Korean govemment controls the banks and 
the levels o f credit offered to industrial finns. To encourage economic development, 
the govemment privileged some key industries and selected firms. When these finns 
entered the industries selected by the govemment, they received assistance and were 
allocated significant amounts o f capital at below market interest rates. The govemment 
directed both state-owned and commercial banks to fund these industrial finns. Such 
bank loans, or so called ‘policy loans’ caixying low interest rates, benefited the 
chaebols. Thus chaebol expansion into new industries was funded, indirectly, by the 
govemment (Lee, 1992; Chung et al., 1997). In addition, because o f their close 
relationship with the govemment and the banks, it was easier for chaebols to boiTOw
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capital from banks than it was for mn-chaebo! firms. As a result, this significant 
allocation o f capital at lower interest rates provided an incentive for chaebols to become 
larger and more diversified. Thus, high levels o f chaebol diversification are likely to be 
positively correlated with high debt levels and low external capital price.
In order to control for govemment intervention in financial markets, I use a 
number o f financial indicators. The interest difference ( /£>, ) is equal to the market
interest minus the interest rates from Deposit Money Bank (DMB) loans to the 
corporate sector. It provides an indication o f how chaebols receive advantages by 
borrowing from DMBs. The larger the difference between the two variables, the greater 
the advantage offered to firms, particularly to chaebols, by their close relationship with 
govemment and banks, and hence their increased diversification. DMB interest rates 
are the price o f extemal capital for corporate financial funds controlled by the 
govemment. I use the average interest rates o f  DMB loans to enterprises from the Bank 
o f Korea (AAAB022). The market interest rate, as the shadow price o f extemal capital, 
is proxied by the average curb market interest rates from the Bank o f Korea (AAAB2). 
As a source o f funds for the corporate sector, loans from informal markets, such as the 
curb market, are substantial in Korea. For example, according to the data from Field 
(1995, p. 106), 17.2%, 19%, and 20.2% o f loans to the corporate sector were from 
banks, non-banks, and informal markets, respectively, during the period 1987-91.^ This 
implies that loans from the informal market are one o f the most substantial sources o f 
capital for Korean firms and reflect the market price o f capital in Korea.
'' During the period 1982-86, the following percentages pertain: 22.6%, 19.2%, and 24.9% from banks, 
non-banks, and informal markets, respectively.
32
I also control for differences in financing costs at the chaebol level. A financial 
cost variable ( FC-, ), which is constructed as the interest payments o f a chaebol divided
by debt o f  the chaebol, is used to proxy for differences in financial costs across 
chaebols. As I discussed above, chaebols with close relationships to the govemment 
and banks generally receive low interest loans. Therefore, firms that receive greater 
subsidies should have low interest payments per unit o f debt. In our model, lower 
financing costs lead to more diversification.
Finally, I use a year dummy variable to control for how chaebols changed their 
diversification behavior before and after the reforms o f  1997 that reduced govemment 
subsidies. The year dummy is set equal to one between 1997 and 2000, and to zero 
otherwise. I expect a negative sign for the year dummy variable, because the 
govemment reduced its subsidization o f firms after the financial crisis, and chaebols, 
therefore, became less d iv e rs if ie d .T a b le  4.3 provides summary statistics for variables 
in the regression analysis. All variables except interest variables are deflated by the 
two-digit producer price indices constructed by the Bank of Korea.
4.4.2. The Em pirical Results
The results o f the diversification regressions are represented in Table 4.4 and 4.5 
for a sample o f  70 chaebols in Korea, from 1986 to 2000. The base specification 
includes chaebol-fixed effects and uses an unbalanced panel, as some chaebols went 
bankmpt and disappeared after the financial crisis in 1997. Table 4.4 presents the first 
set o f  regression results with the Herfindahl Index ( Div^  ^) as a measure o f chaebol 
diversification. The first column o f Table 4.4 reports the results o f a regiession that
N ote that a negative demand shock during the financial crisis could also lead chaebols to becom e less 
diversified.
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includes the chaebol size ( In Asset ) and the ratio o f debt to assets ( ' ) as control
Asset-,
variables. I find that chaebol diversification is positively related to the asset size of 
chaebols. The result indicates that large chaebols have high levels o f diversification. 
This is in agreement with the argument noted previously, i.e., that large finns tend to 
diversify (Berry, 1974; Lechtenberg, 1991).
The debt-asset ratio is statistically significant and has a positive impact on 
diversification. Holding firm size constant, an increase in debt-asset ratios raises the 
level o f diversification. This is consistent with numerous previous studies, which have 
argued that easy access to extemal capital provided an impetus to chaebols to expand 
and diversify (Joh, 2001; Krueger and Woo, 2001; Lee et al., 2002; Chung et al., 1997).
The second column includes the extemal capital price in order to investigate the 
role o f the price o f extemal capital arising from govemment intervention in allocating 
capital in the financial markets. The large and positive sign on ID indicates that the 
larger the difference between market interest rates and DMB’s interest rates (ID), the 
higher the level o f diversification. The results also show that diversification is 
negatively related to financial costs. These results agree with the hypothesis that 
govemment support o f low interest loans to chaebols gave chaebols an advantage with 
respect to the availability o f capital, as well the opportunity to become larger and more 
diversified.
The third column includes a year dummy to control for how chaebols changed 
their diversification behavior before, and after the Crisis, when the reforms that reduced 
govemment subsidies were implemented in 1997. 1 found the year dummy to be 
negatively associated with diversification, implying that chaebols decreased their
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diversification level after the Crisis. This is in agreement with the argument that 
govemment reforms led chaebols to decrease diversification. However, one needs to be 
cautious in over-interpreting this result. Clearly, chaebols faced real negative demand 
shocks during this period and this might also be correlated with the reduction in chaebol 
diversification. The other results are the same as those o f the second column. Finally, I 
report the F tests for the significance o f the fixed effects in all regressions. The 
observed F values, which are statistically significant and large, indicate that the fixed 
effects matter in all specifications.
My next set o f  results repeats the analysis, but examines the number o f segments 
as a dependent variable, instead o f the Herfindahl diversification index. The structure 
o f Table 4.5 is similar to that o f Table 4.4. The overall results are also very similar to 
those presented in Table 4.4. The signs on independent variables are the same, but their 
magnitudes are somewhat increased and become statistically more significant. The 
debt-asset ratio variable, however, becomes smaller and statistically insignificant in the 
third column.
Alternatively, I estimate the same regression, allowing chaebol-random effects 
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity o f chaebols. The random-effects estimator 
differs from the fixed-effects estimator because the random-effects model uses cross­
chaebol variation to identify the parameters, while fixed-effects model uses only within- 
firm variation to estimate the parameters. I report the results in Table 4.6. The results 
o f  the random-effects model are very similar to those o f the fixed-effect model in all 
regressions.
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Over all, as expected from the theoretical model, the analysis finds that chaebols 
become more diversified if  their usage o f extemal capital is increased (holding chaebol 
size constant), the price o f  extemal eapital is lower, and/or the financial costs decrease. 
In addition, the crisis o f  1997 led chaebols to become less diversified. The findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol diversification is related to easy access to 
extemal capital.
4.5. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined the relationship between diversification and financing 
issues, using a sample o f  70 Korean conglomerates operating in Korea between 1986 
and 2 0 0 0 . In this chapter, a testable theory was proposed for a situation in which the 
govemment allocated financial resources to a fixed number o f firms to maximize the 
national output level. Given allocated extemal capital and a standard U-shaped cost 
function, firms choose the number o f their divisions to minimize the total costs. The 
model shows that as the amount o f extemal capital increases, firms will be more 
diversified.
Empirical analysis shows that chaebols with high debt to assets ratio had high 
levels o f diversification. Larger differences between the market capital price and 
business loan interest rates also led to higher levels o f diversification. Chaebols with 
lower levels o f financial costs o f  extemal debt have higher levels o f diversification. In 
addition, chaebols reduced their level o f diversification after the 1997 crisis. The results 
indicate that finns have an incentive to diversify when they have access to cheap 
extemal capital. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that chaebols are
36
overly diversified as a result o f govemment support, as discussed by Krueger and Yoo 
(2001 ).
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Table 4.1. Sample Information and Basic Statistics
Sample Periods: 1986-2000
Number o f Korean business groups, known as chaebols 70
Number o f finns affiliated with the chaebols 1,494
Number o f non-financial and banking finns within the 
chaebols
1,337
Average number o f affiliated firms for each chaebol 19.11
(13.87)
Average number o f industries in which each chaebol was 
engaged for each sample year
6.29
(3.96)
Observations in Analysis*
Number o f  affiliated finns in analysis 1,177
Average number o f firms affiliated with each chaebol 16.81
(12.47)
Average number o f  industries in which each chaebol was 
engaged for each sample year
5.57
(3.77)
Note that standard deviations are in parentheses.
* Observations in analysis are those observations after eliminating financial and 
banking firms and some marginal firms (157 firms) and non-information firms for the 
measurement o f  the diversification index (160 finns).
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Table 4.2. The Correlation Matrix Between Chaebol Debt and Size
Variables Debt Asset Sales
Debt 1 . 0 0 0 0
Asset 0.9470 1 . 0 0 0 0
Sales 0.9007 0.9696 1 . 0 0 0 0
Table 4.3. Sum m ary Statistics for Regression Variables
V ariable Mean Std. Div.
Div (the Herfindahl Index) 0.474 0 . 2 2 2
Log o f segment number (InSeg) 2.169 0.672
Log o f assets (InAsset) 13.883 1.631
Debt/assets 0.632 0.479
Interest difference (ID) 0 . 0 2 2 0.030
Interest payment/debt (FC) 0.058 0.032
Note Div denotes the Herfindahl Index for diversification.
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Tabic 4.4. Regression Results with the Herfindahl Index and Chaebol Fixed Effects
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable: The Herfindahl Index (DIV)
( 1 ) (2 ) (3)
Constants -0.249** -0.430** -0.638**
(0.064) (0.073) (0.079)
InAsset 0.047** 0.063** 0.079**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Debt/Asset 0.087** 0.124** 0.074**
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0 .0 2 1 )
ID 0.397** 0.339*
(0.141) (0.138)
FC -1.214** -0.791**
(0.154) (0.165)
Year Dummy -0.068**
(0 .0 1 1 )
Adj.R2
Observation
0.7663
910
0.7845
910
0.7940
910
F test 33.84 36.16 37.03
Note that standard deviations are in parentheses. ** and * denote 99% and 95% 
significance, respectively. ID is the average difference between market and DMB 
interest rates. FC is the interest payment divided by total debt.
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Table 4.5, Regression Results with the Number of Segments and Chaebol Fixed
Effects
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable; The Number o f Segment s (InSeg)
(1) (2) (3)
Constants -0.664** -1.453** -2.552**
(0.156) (0.202) (0.204)
InAsset 0.207** 0.258** 0.345**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Debt/Asset 0.169** 0.294** 0.027
(0.058) (0.057) (0.056)
ID 1.270** 0.964**
(0.390) (0.358)
FC -4.046** -1.821**
(0.428) (0.429)
Year Dummy -0.357**
(0.028)
Adj.R2
Observation
0.7663
910
0.7845
910
0.7940
910
F test 22.87 22.14 25.02
Note that standard deviations are in parentheses. ** denotes 99% significance. ID is the 
average difference between market and DMB interest rates. FC is the interest payment 
divided by total debt.
41
Table 4.6. Regression Results with the Herfindahl Index and Chaebol Random
Effects
Independent Dependent Variable: The Herfindahl Index (DIV)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constants -0.265** -0.436** -0.624**
(0.065) (0.073) (0.077)
InAsset 0.048** 0.062** 0.078**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Debt/Asset 0.087** 0.124** 0.073**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
ID 0.405** 0.327*
(0.139) (0.137)
FC -1.209** -0.791**
(0.153) (0.164)
Year Dummy -0.067**
(0.011)
R2 0.1925 0.2071 0.2326
Observation 910 910 910
Note that standard deviations are in parentheses. ** and * denote 99% and 95% 
significance, respectively. ID is the average difference between market and DMB 
interest rates. FC is the interest payment divided by total debt.
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Chapter 5.
Chaebol Structure and Industry Productivity Growth in Korea
5.1. Introduction
Even though large business groups are commonly observed in many countries, the 
largest Korean business groups known as chaebols play a particularly large and 
important role in the Korean economy. Chaebols have specific characteristics that 
differ from business groups o f other countries. Korean chaebols are very large and 
diversified horizontally as well as vertically with strong central control systems. In 
addition, chaebols have strong linkage to both the government and to special banks.
Starting in the late 1940s and 1950s, most o f  the largest chaebols grew rapidly 
under favorable policies o f  the Korean government. Government support, in the form 
o f controlled exchange allocations, low interest loans, government construction 
contracts, import licenses, large-scale tax benefits, and export subsidies, was given to 
chaebols. With substantial government support and the use o f diversification strategies, 
chaebols have come to play a significant role in economic development, dominate the 
Korean economy, and have gained increasing international recognition. According to 
data from the Fair Trade Commission in South Korea, the largest 30 chaebols have total 
sales equal to approximately 71%, 75%, and 76% of Korea’s GDP in 1988, 1993, and
1996, respectively.
However, in spite o f their growth, before and during the Asian financial crisis o f
1997, the six largest chaebols went bankrupt, thus shocking the Korean economy 
greatly and resulting in its collapse (Krueger and Woo, 2001 ; Joh, 2001). Many argue 
that chaebols that had high debt and were broadly diversified played a very important 
role in leading to the Crisis. The rational given is that the ovcrdiversification of
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chaebols is widely believed to be an important source o f inefficiency resulting in an 
industrial structure that was particularly susceptible to the financial shocks that occuiTed 
in the 1990s.
This chapter investigates the relationship between chaebol structure and industry 
perfomiance. This analysis is accomplished by combining microeconomic information 
on Korean manufacturing firms with industry-level production data for the sample 
period 1988-1998. I provide evidence on how the level o f diversification o f Korean 
business groups affects industry performance. This paper concentrates on the 
hypothesis that diversification o f chaebols has a negative impact on the level and 
growth o f  industry productivity.
In order to investigate the effects o f  chaebols on industry performance, I measure 
the diversification o f chaebols using traditional diversification indices: the inverse o f 
the number o f industries in which a chaebol operates, the Herfindahl index, and the 
entropy index. I find that chaebols are highly diversified, but the diversification pattern 
varies across time. Before the Crisis, chaebols were becoming increasingly diversified. 
After the Crisis, diversification declined markedly.
Next, 1 examine the effect o f  this change in industrial structure on the level and 
growth o f  TFP and labor productivity. TFP and labor productivity are measured at the 
industry level disaggregated by employee size class. At the industry level, I test 
whether the structure o f  chaebols affects productivity and its growth. Two variables are 
used to measure the characteristics o f c/me6oA-diversification index and the share o f 
chaebols in an industry. The diversification index measures the diversification o f all
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chaebols at the three-digit SIC industry level and the labor input share indicates how 
important chaebols are in an industry.
1 find that industries with higher levels o f chaebol diversification have lower total 
factor productivity and lower total factor productivity growth. Alternatively, the 
relative importance o f chaebols, measured as the labor share o f chaebols in an industry, 
is relatively uncorrelated with the level and the growth o f TFP. For robustness checks, 
the level and growth o f industry labor productivity defined as value-added divided by 
the number o f employees are also used as alternative productivity measures. As in the 
case o f  TFP analysis, the correlation between chaebol diversification and labor 
productivity is also negative. Overall, the results in this chapter are consistent with the 
view that overdiversification by Korean business groups has had a negative impact on 
economic performance. These findings are consistent with previous studies that found 
that diversification is negatively related to economic performance (Lichtenberg, 1992; 
Gollop, 1997; Lang and Stulz, 1994).
The rest o f this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the theoretical 
background. Section 5.3 describes the data and the construction o f variables for 
analysis. Section 5.4 reports the empirical analysis o f TFP and TFP growth by 
combining chaebol-data on diversification with industry data on productivity. Section 
5.5 provides the alternative analysis that provides robustness checks o f  the main results. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2. The Theoretical Background
One o f the most interesting issues in the study o f industrial organization is the effect 
o f diversification on perfonriance. A large number o f empirical studies have found a
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negative relationship between diversification and performance. ' ' The reasons for this 
negative relationship are both diversification itself and cross-subsidization. Mork, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), in their study o f a sample o f 326 US acquisitions between 
1975 and 1987, found a negative relationship between diversification and perfonnance 
when firms made unrelated acquisitions. By supporting poor performing divisions, the 
practice o f cross-subsidization through the internal capital markets by diversified firms 
fosters inefficiency (Sharfstein, 1997; Lamont, 1997; or Shin and Stulz, 1998). Many 
other studies have also found a negative relationship between diversification and finn 
performance (e.g., Berger & Ofeck, 1995; Lins & Servaes, 1999; and Lamont & Polk, 
2000). Alternatively, some studies find a positive relationship when the focus is 
restricted to related diversification (Lecraw, 1984) and the presence o f multimarket 
contracts in concentrated industries (Scott, 1993). Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue that 
diversifying acquisitions made positive abnormal returns in the 1960s when internal 
capital markets functioned better than external markets did.
However, few studies have investigated the relationship between diversification 
and productivity. Lichtenberg (1992) analyzes the relationship between diversification 
and total factor productivity (TFP) using plant-level Census Bureau data. He states that 
productivity is inversely related to diversification when he controls only for firm size. 
Gollop (1997) suggests that specialization o f manufacturing plants is positively 
associated with plant-level total factor productivity. Recently, Vannoni (2000a) 
examined a sample o f 119 firms operating in Italy in 1993 and found that integration
" Many studies have been conducted for that examines the effect o f  diversification on the value o f  the 
firm instead o f  the effect on productivity (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofeck, 1995). An excellent 
review o f  the literature is provided by Lang and Stulz ( 1994). They show that Tobin's q is negatively 
related to firm diversification in the 1980s.
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strategies increase the level o f total factor productivity, though the degree of 
diversification is not significantly related to productivity. In another analysis o f the 
effects o f corporate diversification on productivity using plant-level Census Bureau 
data, Schoar (2000) finds that diversification, as a corporate strategy, is negatively 
associated with total factor productivity. Although, she does find that newly diversified 
divisions within the same firm have higher productivity, on average, than specialized 
firms within their industries. In this study, I attempt to examine the correlation between 
the level o f  diversification in the largest Korean business groups, i.e., chaebols, and the 
level and growth o f industry-level productivity in the Korean manufacturing sectors.
Theoretical and empirical studies have suggested that the phenomenon of 
diversification is associated with characteristics o f the firm and industry structure, both 
o f which have a systematic influence on industry performance. Each firm makes a 
decision regarding entry, exit, or expansion based on its specific characteristics and 
profit opportunities both within and across industries. For instance, if  a finn is in a fast- 
growing industry with high levels o f profitability and high sunk entry costs, the firm 
may continue conducting business in the industry. However, if  some obstacles exist, 
such as the presence o f transaction costs, the finn may not be able to utilize its 
resources even though it has accumulated resources with rapid growth. In such a 
circumstance, a firm may accumulate a significant amount o f underutilized resources. 
The firm has an incentive to utilize these resources. In many cases, the firm will 
attempt to pursue diversified expansion by entering new industries in which the firm 
can increase market share as long as diversification or expansion provides a way of
W illiam G. Shepherd (1970), Rhoades (1973), and Lecraw (1984) have explicitly treated diversification 
as an clement o f  industry structure.
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more profitably employing underused resources. Even though this expansion cannot 
guarantee profits, some firms may have an incentive to diversify by utilizing these 
accumulated resources instead o f returning them to the owners. Consequently, the 
presence o f accumulated, though underutilized resources may affect the type and the 
degree o f diversification.
Many studies suggest that there are more varied advantages for large and 
diversified firms than for smaller or less diversified firms. Large-size firms in a given 
industry tend to be more efficient due to unobservable variables, such as outstanding 
managerial and labor skills, or scale economies, resulting in lower prices (Demsetz, 
1973; Peltzman, 1977). Large diversified firms may offer a wide range o f services 
using existing sales networks. They may also possess a good reputation with an existing 
brand name that is widely recognized, thus distinguishing their products from other 
smaller, or rival firms’ products. Furthermore, they may have resources that are 
transferable to several activities, for example, in response to an increase in demand or 
price. These resources may create opportunities to realize economies o f scope for large 
diversified firms, such as a cost advantage, by allowing them to distribute resources 
across processes, which may result in lower costs in the developing production and 
marketing o f multiple goods (Teece, 1982; Levy, 1989). W olf ( 1977) points out that 
utilizable resources may be exploited by the large and diversified finn in its product 
development, product marketing, and financing. Thus, firms endowed with substantial 
resources in comparison to smaller or specialized finns may have a wider range o f 
investment opportunities. In these circumstances, diversifying finns may in fact be
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more productive and hence one might find a positive relationship between 
diversification and productivity.
However, large diversified firms have some disadvantages compared to 
specialized or small firms. Large diversified firms may incur greater managerial costs 
than specialized firms. There are increased difficulties for parent firms associated with 
the management o f large and complex affiliated divisions. They may also be inefficient 
due to cross-subsidizing poor performing divisions. It has been argued that diversified 
firms invest too much in their bad divisions and too little in their good divisions 
(Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein, 1997). A variety of evidence supports the 
conclusion that resources flow to inefficient divisions, i.e., diversified firms 
inefficiently transfer resources from good performing divisions to poor performing 
divisions (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lamont, 1997; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). 
They misallocate their resources, resulting in a negative relationship between 
diversification and performance.
Another factor driving firms, particularly in Korea, to enter into unrelated 
industries and to maintain that presence is provided by the investment subsidies in the 
form of low interest loans, government construction contracts, and large-scale tax 
benefits. Political subsidies may increase market size as well as the resource level o f 
the benefiting firms and industries, reducing finns’ investment costs. As these policies 
encourage firms to enter new industries by subsidizing specific finns or industries, they 
also depress turnover as well as increase diversification even for inefficient finns. The 
Korean government has offered supporting programs to selected and protected finns in
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many industries. This potential government subsidization o f inefficient firms may have 
a significant influence on the negative perfonnance o f industries.'^
In Korea, it has been argued that a main influence o f the size, diversification, 
and structure o f Korean business groups is the policies o f the government in the 
allocation o f capital. The Korean government controls banks and use their lending 
practices to manipulate interest rates, control credit, and channel domestic and foreign 
savings to Korean industrial firms. In the economic development plan o f Korea, the 
government listed some key industries and selected some firms as beneficiaries. The 
selected firms received assistance and hence allocated a significant portion o f the capital 
budget with interest rates lower than market interest rates (Joh, 2001). There are several 
reasons why the Korean government chose this industrial policy after the Korean War. 
First, capital formation was inadequate and Korean firms had little access to new 
technologies (Chung, Lee and Jung, 1997). South Korea was poorly endowed with 
natural resources and was supporting a large population. During the early 
industrialization periods, much o f Korea’s early domestic capital formation came from 
foreign aid and primarily targeted basic manufacturing industries, such as cement, 
fertilizer, and textiles. Second, only a small number o f  firms existed at the beginning of 
the industrialization period.''' To develop a national economy, the government utilized 
and financed the existing firms, especially the chaebols. These "'chaebols" developed 
close relationships with banks and the government. Regarding these relationships. Field 
( 1995) reported as: “the majority o f today’s largest chaebols.. .got their start during the
' Krueger and Yoo (2001) have documented the importance o f  investment subsidies and industrial 
policies for chaebols in Korea and the influence o f  these policies on the financial crisis o f  1997.
For extreme example, as Field (1995, p.32) documented. " ... by 1940 there were still only fourteen 
agricultural and ten industrial Korean-owned companies with capital exceedly 500,000 (Japanese) yen.
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late 1940s and 1950s, ... the chaebol accumulated capital by using political 
connections...” (p.37). Because o f these connections with the government, chaebols are 
able to access capital more easily than non-chaebol firms and at a lower cost. Thus, the 
chaebols benefited the most Ifom subsidized bank credit and from the government- 
owned development funds and grew fast. As the Korean government has increasingly 
regulated the financial system over time, capital has been allocated more heavily toward 
chaebol firms and selected industries.
One problem with this approach to the allocation o f capital is that it may create 
inefficiencies in the economy. If the government subsidies are heavily assigned to 
inefficient firms or encourage firms to overdiversify, it distorts the distribution of 
resources, systemically driving a negative performance in industries. Haggard and Mo 
(2000) argue that these policies resulted in an investment boom in the period 1994- 
1996. Investment in manufacturing facilities rose by an average 38.5% per year. They 
also pointed out that " ... these distorted incentives in the financial sector allowed the 
chaebols to raise and invest unprecedented amounts o f capital in 1994-1996”(p.208).
As a result, the reckless government intervention in the financial sectors gave chaebols 
motivation for expansion. Similarly, Krueger and Yoo (2001 ) argue that the Korean 
government’s financial policy had created crony capitalism before the Crisis. This 
skewed allocation system contributed to the weakness and inefficiency of the financial 
and banking systems and were the most probable factors leading to the Crisis.
Alternatively, the existence o f large diversified finns may be a result o f strong 
management. For example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argued that a finn under 
good management might expand in several fields in which the finn has comparative
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advantages. In this case, diversification and the market share o f large and diversified 
firms are likely to be positively associated with the level and growth o f industry 
productivity.
Hence, there are reasons why one might expect to see either a positive or 
negative correlation between performance and diversification. In fact, as 1 discussed in 
Chapter 3, the empirical findings regarding diversification and economic performance 
in the US are quite mixed. For Korea, however, one might expect the negative 
relationship to dominate because o f the importance o f the non-market allocation of 
capital to chaebols. These subsidies created by the government provide an incentive for 
the chaebol to expand both vertically and horizontally. In the remaining seetions of the 
chapter, 1 explore these possibilities.
5.3. Data and the Construction of Variables
5.3.1. Data Sources
The manufaeturing data used in this paper come from the Korean manufacturing 
census taken every five years. This data set includes industry-level data on 
manufacturing industries, where industries are defined according to the Korean 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC 15000-37999). The data are constructed by 
combining infonnation on about 80,000 establishments, with more than five employees, 
for each census year. The data give detailed information on aggregate output, value- 
added, employment, tangible fixed assets (a proxy for capital), and other variables by 
employee size class. The data allow for the construction o f an aggregate productivity 
measure for each industry, size class, and year. 1 use a sub-sample at the three-digit SIC 
level because most chaebol firms are only classified at the three-digit Korean SIC level.
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Census data are available for the periods, 1988, 1993, and 1998. Table 5.1 reports 
sample information and basic statistics. The total number o f all manufacturing 
industries at the three-digit SIC level is 61.
Even though the data at the finn level is usually very limited in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries in East Asia, the datasets o f the Korean Economic Research 
Institute (KERI), National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), and LG Securities 
(LG) used for this study provide financial information regarding the largest business 
groups and nongroup firms. The KERI dataset has the advantage of identifying the 70 
largest chaebols and their affiliated firms since 1986, and includes a set o f financial 
variables. Chaebol-fxrms are identified as firms that belong to the Korean business 
groups if  they are within the same ownership or under the control o f a single parent 
firm. I augment the KERI data with NICE and LG databases to expand the financial 
information.'^ Even though some firms are classified at the 5-digit Korean SIC level, 
most firms have only 3-digit SIC codes. Thus, I can investigate the effect o f  chaebol 
firms on the productivity growth at the three-digit SIC level. Diversification is defined 
according to each group’s activity in more than one industry at the three-digit SIC level.
As seen in Table 5.1, the 70 chaebols have 1,024 firms identified in 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries at the three-digit SIC level during the 
sample period. Each chaebol has on average 14.63 firms and produces in 7.7 industries. 
Firms with primary SIC codes in the financial and banking industries (SIC 650-699) are 
not included in this study, because they are regulated and have different financial 
information (e.g., no sales), making comparisons difficult. After eliminating 
nonmanufacturing firms as well as financial and banking firms, the number o f  chaebol
The three large-state own groups are excluded.
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finns in manufacturing industries is 459 during the sample period. On average each 
chaebol has 6.96 firms and that produce in 3.78 manufacturing industries.
Among the 61 industries in manufacturing at the three-digit level, chaebols 
produce in 48 industries. There are also a few firms that do not provide an annual 
report or detailed financial data. These are not included in the analysis. For analyzing 
the diversification effect o f  chaebols on industry productivity growth, 420 firms are 
matched with the complete annual reports for the three sample periods. On average, 
each chaebol has 6.12 firms and is active in three to four industries.
5.3.2. The Measurement of Diversification Indices
In order to examine the correlation between the structure o f Korean business groups 
and the level and growth o f industry productivity, I will construct a diversification 
index. Because chaebols are typically characterized by horizontal diversification as 
well as vertical integration in a wide range o f industries, the index should be sensitive to 
the chaebols' activities for manufacturing industries as well as for nonmanufacturing 
industries.
In order to understand how diversified chaebols are, 1 first measure the degree of 
diversification o f 70 chaebols using traditional diversification indices at the two-digit 
SIC level. These indices include the inverse o f  the number o f sectors, the Herfindahl 
index, and the entropy index. Berry (1971) used the Herfindahl index as a 
diversification index by applying the index’s methodology to the distribution of a firm’s 
industrial activity. The Herfindahl index has the fonn , where Sje is the share o f
the i'*' industry (or product) in total sales o f chaebol c. The index of diversification for 
chaebol c can be written as:
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(5.1) H D , = \ - Y sI
This index varies between zero and one. Perfect specialization, a single chaebol, yields 
a value o f zero while for a very diversified chaebol the index will approach one. In 
addition, the more unequal the share sizes o f  the chaebol c in each industry are or the 
greater the number o f industries it operates in, the larger the index will be. If the shares 
are equal across the industries o f a chaebol operates in, the index simplifies
to HD^ = I -  , where is the number o f industries (or products) in which chaebol
c produces. While the index satisfies most properties o f  a diversification index, it does 
not address product heterogeneity.'^ That is, how different the underlying industries are 
that make up the index.
The entropy index for diversification o f chaebol c proposed by Jacquemin and Berry 
(1979) is as follows:
(5.2)
The index varies between zero to InN^. If chaebol c is active in only a single industry, 
the entropy is zero. As the chaebol becomes more diversified, the index rises. The 
index increases as the number o f  industries rise or as the industry shares a firm operates 
in become more equal (holding number o f industries constant).
Table 5.2 reports the average diversification o f chaebols for each index. The second 
column o f Table 5.2 is the average number o f sectors in which each chaebol is engaged. 
The third and fourth columns o f Table 5.2 are the Herfindahl index (HD) and the 
entropy index. The results are quite consistent across three measures o f diversification.
Gollop et al. discuss the Properties o f  each diversification index. See Gollop et al. (1991) in detail.
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The large Korean business group level o f diversifieation rose from 1986 to 1996 (the 
year preceding the Asian financial crisis). After the Crisis, diversification decreased 
sharply. The number based index (column 2) shows that the chaebols produce in, on 
average, 4.5 industries in 1986 to a peak o f  7.6 in 1996 and subsequently fell back to an 
average o f 5.3 in 2000. The Herfindahl index and entropy index show a similar pattern. 
The Herfindahl index increased by 39% from 1986 to 1996 and then fell sharply by 
23% from 1996 to 2000.
For this study, 1 measure diversification at the chaebol level and industry level for 
each industry. I begin with the Herfindahl index for the degree o f specialization, 
because it is sensitive to the number and distribution o f industry shares produced by a 
business group. In addition, in order to measure the importance o f chaebols in an 
industry, the share o f the chaebol in terms o f total labor o f all chaebols in an industry is 
used to weight equation (5.1) and thus, the chaebols' diversification index (hereafter, 
CD) is written as
c
(5.3) CD, = l - g w j , H ,  ,fo rc = l,2  ...,C
c=l
where C is the total number o f chaebols in the i"’ industry and where /.^  is
L-Ç
the labor o f chaebol c at the i'"^  industry and L is the labor o f all chaebols in the i‘'' 
industry.
This diversification index accounts for the degree o f the specialization of chaebols 
across all industries they operate in including both manufaeturing and non­
manufacturing. However, 1 only examine the impact o f chaebol diversification on 
industry perfonnance for the manufacturing sector.
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In addition to the diversification o f chaebols, 1 also examine how important 
chaebols are in the industry. For measuring the importance o f chaebols, I use the 
chaebols' labor input share in the industry. This is constructed as
(5.4) Sj =
A
where is the labor o f all chaebols and L, is the total labor in i''' industry.
Table 5.3 reports statistics as the diversification index (CD) and labor share (S) 
for chaebols for the major manufacturing industries. Note that the table is different 
from Table 5.2 in that it weights the diversification indices by labor shares. It also 
assumes that non-chaebol firms are specialized. The patterns o f chaebol diversification 
observed in these data are more muted than in Table 5.2. However, the index still 
shows an increase in diversification in almost all industries from 1988 to 1993 and a 
decrease from 1993 to 1998 in most industries.
5.3.3. The Measurement of Total Factor Productivity and TFP Growth
To understand the contribution o f chaebols to the level and growth of industry 
productivity, I measure the total factor productivity (TFP) at the three-digit 
manufacturing level using a neoclassical production function for which Q^ , is the real 
gross output o f the i'^ industry in year t as:
( 5 .5 )  g ,  = f ( / i r , , Z . , , M , )
where , 1,.,, and M,, are capital, labor, and intennediate inputs, respectively. Since 
the objective is to measure the productivity at the aggregate industry level, 1 use the 
methodology o f Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni ( 1987) based on the concept o f value- 
added. Value-added is constructed as the difference between output and materials. The
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value-added approach requires that capital and labor inputs and time are separable from 
the material input. Assuming that the production function is separable in materials, 
equation 5.5 can be rewritten as (assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function):
(5.6) V , = F ( K , „ l „ )  = A K i; 'l '‘
After taking logarithms, we have:
(5.7) In = In .4 + /?, In AT., + In A, 
where A, is the value-added in the industi’y i at year t.
To measure the total factor productivity (TFP) o f each industry at the three-digit 
industry level, I measure the residuals o f equation 5.7, which can be written as:
(5.8) \nTFP, = In V, -  A ”  /^i 1"^,, “  Â  In A,
The equation implies that the TFP for each aggregate industry and year is the 
estimated residual from these regressions. The TFP regressions also include a constant 
term, representing the idiosyncratic effect o f productivity. I do not impose the 
restriction for constant return to scale for a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production 
function.
With regards to the measure o f the specific variables, real value-added is 
constructed using two-digit producer price deflators indexed to 1995. Capital inputs are 
proxied as tangible fixed assets, deflated by the capital price index constructed by the 
Bank o f Korea for total capital fonnation. Labor is defined as the average number o f 
monthly employees. Because the Census data do not provide data for hours worked, 1 
cannot directly measure TFP adjusted by hours worked. However, the department of 
labor provides data for hours worked at the two-digit industry level. Utilizing this data.
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I attempt to estimate two measures o f TFP at the three-digit industry level using the 
number o f workers weighted by two-digit hours worked data.
5.3.4. Summary Statistics
In this section, I provide summary statistics o f the log o f TFP and TFP growth. 
Table 5.4 presents statistics for the regression variables used in the estimation o f the 
production function 5.7. The TFP regressions are estimated with industry fixed effects. 
Equation 5.7 gives the results o f the main specification below:
InV,  = 0.32 In L,, +0.73 In A:,,
(0.02) (0.01) Obs.=1228 R2=0.9226.
This estimate shows a larger capital share than labor share as other researchers have
shown (e.g., Yuhn and Kwon, 2000). It is consistent with the views o f many studies
that have emphasized that capital inputs, which have accumulated rapidly, play a crucial
role in the high perfonnance in East Asian economies as well as the Korean economy
(Kim and Lau, 1994; Young, 1995; Krugman, 1994).
Panel B shows three measurements o f  TFP growth by breaking the data into 
employee-size class. The first column is the unweighted growth o f the log o f TFP and 
the second column is the TFP growth measured by the adjusted labor inputs weighted 
by hours worked. Recall, the industry level data are disaggregated by employee size 
class. Table 5.4 indicates that the average value of TFP growth for each industry is 
0.068, implying a 1.36% increase in TFP growth for the annual average.
Many previous studies have perfonned a similar measurement o f the growth o f 
TFP for the Korean economy. Young (1995) perfonned a growth accounting analysis 
for East Asian economies. In his study, the annual growth rate o f  TFP for the Korean
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manufacturing industry is 3% for the period 1966-90. Timmer and Ark (forthcoming) 
measure the growth o f TFP for the Korean economy using capital stock and capital 
services for the period 1963-96. They measured capital inputs in terms o f aggregate 
stoek and service flows. The growth rates o f TFP are 0.83% and 0.51 % for capital 
stock and capital service flows, respectively. Timmer and Ark also report the growth 
rates o f TFP during the period 1985-96 for the two capital input measurements are 
2.27% and 2.21%. Alternatively, Kim and Lau (1994) measure the TFP o f the Korean 
economy and the annual growth rate o f TFP at 1.2% for 1966-90 period. The 
measurements o f growth rates o f TFP from many studies differ widely as a result o f 
utilizing different methodology and sample periods.'^ However, the estimate reported 
here at (1.36%) is certainly in the middle o f reported range o f other authors.
In Panel B, the three TFP growth measure are disaggregated into eight size 
classes to investigate whether different size finns may have different TFP growth 
patterns. That is, it can be that smaller firms have low TFP, while larger firms have 
high level o f TFP if  larger fiims tend to be more efficient due to advantages of 
unobservable variables, e.g., managerial talent, lowering production cost as Demsetz 
(1973) and Peltzman (1977) have argued. The Panel B shows that InTFP growth and 
InTFP adjusted for hours worked are very similar to each other in the growth rates both 
overall and across size class levels. There is no systematic pattern across the size 
classes for either o f the TFP growth variables.
Many other .studies measured TFP for Korean economy. See Felipe (1997) in detail.
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5.4. The Empirical Analysis
5.4.1. The Empirical Model
In this section, I present a regression analysis that describes the relationship 
between chaebol diversification and the level and growth of industry TFP. In order to 
examine this relationship, 1 specify a basic regression model o f  the following form;
(5.9) y,, =M,.,6 + e,
where i represents i"' industry, is the productivity and its giowth. A/,., is a matrix o f
observable characteristic indicators, 6 is a parameter vector, and e, is the residual o f the 
regression.
In order to investigate the effects o f chaebol diversification on industry 
performance, I employ two dependent variables for y„ : total factor productivity and its
growth rate. TFP is measured as in equation (5. 8). The characteristics in M„ include
the diversification index CD,, (from equation 5.3), the total labor share o f the chaebol
Sj, (equation 5.4), and the interactive variable o f the chaebol CD„ x 5',,. The empirical
specification also includes controls for employee size Z„ (a set o f seven size class
dummies) and industry fixed effects. Using these variables, equation 5.9 may be 
written as a basic regression model:
(5.10) y;, = a ,+ 6 ,Z „ + 6 2 C D ,,+ % + 6 ,( C D ,x 5 ', , )  + e, 
where a, is industry effect and e, is the error tenn.
The specification includes two control variables that measure the importance 
and diversification o f chaebols in an industry. The labor share variable attempts to 
quantify the importance o f the presence o f chaebols in an industry on TFP and TFP
6 2
growth. The diversification variable attempts to measure the impact o f chaebol 
diversification on TFP and TFP growth. If overdiversification leads to inefficient 
production, then industries that are populated by very diversified chaebols may 
experience reduced productivity and productivity growth. In this case, we would expect 
that productivity would decline as diversification increases. An interaction term 
(CD*S) is included to capture the possibility that in sectors with large chaebols' shares, 
diversification may have a particularly large impact on economic performance.
5.4.2. Empirical Results
The results o f  the TFP regression analysis are presented in Tables 5.5 through 5.8. 
As stated above, the specifications include industry fixed effects and hence rely on the 
within industry variation to identify the parameters. The base specification also 
includes a set o f dummy variables to control for size class. I first present a specification 
with only the diversification in order to see the simple effect o f diversification without 
the interactions o f  chaebol share terms. Examining the first column o f Table 5 .5 ,1 find 
that diversification is negatively related to the level o f TFP in the industry. Industries 
that have chaebols with high levels o f diversification have lower productivity. This 
agrees with many o f  the previous studies that found that diversification was negatively 
associated with economic perfonnance (e.g., Lichtenberg, 1992; Lang and Stulz, 1994).
The next column includes only the chaebol share variable. Here, 1 find no effect o f 
chaebol share on industry productivity. The last two columns incorporate both 
variables and include the interaction. In each case, only the diversification variable is 
statistically significant and there is little impact on the magnitude or significance o f the 
diversification result. The result is that higher levels o f chaebol diversification are
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associated with lower levels o f TFP. The other variable in the regression, the size class 
dummies, are statistically, significantly, and generally positive. The positive sign 
indicates that the larger size classes have higher TFP than the smaller size classes. 
However, the pattern o f coefficients is not monotonie.
Table 5.6 is similar in structure to Table 5.5 but it also includes time dummies in the 
base model. These time dummies will control for overall trend in productivity. Note 
that one could argue that diversification affects the overall trend and that is why 1 have 
presented both the results with and without time effects. The overall results are very 
similar to those presented in Table 5.5. O f the main variables o f interest, only the 
diversification variable matters. The sign is the same (negative) but the magnitude o f 
the effects is somewhat reduced. Looking at the time trend, we see higher productivity 
in the 1998 period as compared to the earlier years. However, the key point here is that 
even after controlling for trend change in productivity, increasing diversification o f 
chaebols had a negative impact on industry productivity.
While the level o f productivity is certainly important, we are also concerned with 
how diversification is related to productivity change. My next set o f results repeats the 
analysis but looks at productivity growth for the two five-year periods-1988 to 1993 and 
1993 to 1998. Again, the data utilized are industry level-size group data. The structure 
o f Table 5.7 and 5.8 is the same as Table 5.5 and 5.6. The results are very similar to the 
levels o f regressions with regard to the chaebol-size group data. The diversification 
variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that industries with higher 
business group diversification have lower TFP growth. Moreover, the chaebol share 
and the interaction are again not statistically significant in these regressions. These
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patterns hold true for both sets o f regressions (with and without the time period dummy). 
Finally, in all regressions, I report the tests the significance o f the fixed industiy effects 
with an F test. The observed F values are statistically significant and large, implying 
the fixed industry effects matter in the base specifications.
Alternatively, I also test for chaebol effects on TFP growth measured by adjusted 
labor inputs using hours worked multiplied by the average number o f monthly 
employees. I report the results in Table 5.1 .A. The results are very similar to the effect 
on TFP growth with the number of workers.
Overall, the TFP results show a robust pattern. Higher levels o f chaebol 
diversification are associated with lower industry productivity and lower industry 
productivity growth. The share o f the chaebols in the industry, however, is uncorrelated 
with industry performance.
5.5. Alternative Analysis
The previous section focused on examining changes in chaebol diversification 
on the level and growth o f industry TFP. In this sub-section, 1 will perform robustness 
checks of the main results with an alternative productivity measure because the analysis 
based on TFP is sensitive to the characterization o f the production structure. Total 
factor productivity measured by the error tenn in equation 5.8 may be influenced by 
strong assumptions about the underlying specification o f the production function. To 
perform robustness checks, the log of industry labor productivity and its growth are 
used as alternative productivity measures. The log o f labor productivity is defined as 
the logarithm o f value-added divided by the number o f employees in each size class 
level.
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Table 5.9 and 5.10 is similar in structure to Table 5.5 and 5.6 (with and without 
time period dummies), but includes a eapital-labor ratio as an additional control variable 
and labor productivity as a dependent variable instead o f industry TFP. The overall 
results are very similar to those presented in Table 5.5 and 5.6. The sign on 
diversification is the same but the magnitude o f the effects is somewhat reduced while 
chaebol share has again no impact on labor productivity. Moreover, the interactions 
that are not statistically significant are the same. In each ease, the capital-labor ratios, 
size class, and time dummy variables are statistically significant and positive.
The next set o f  analyses re-estimates the regressions in the same structure in 
Table 5.7 and 5.8 but looks at the effects o f chaebol diversification on labor 
productivity growth including the growth o f a capital-labor ratio. As seen in Table 5.11 
and 5.12, the diversification variable is negative and statistically significant, confirming 
that industries that have chaebols with high level o f diversification had lower labor 
productivity growth. Again, the chaebol share and interaction are not statistically 
significant in these regressions (with and without the time period dummy). O f the size 
dummies, the size 7 dummy variable becomes significant. Moreover, the capital-labor 
variable is statistically significant and large, indicating that industries that have higher 
eapital-labor growth have higher labor productivity growth. Taken together, the results 
from these robustness cheeks provide further evidence that the higher levels o f chaebol 
diversification are correlated with lower industry performance.
5.6. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter explores how the structure o f chaebols relates to industry 
performance in terms o f total factor productivity, labor productivity, and their growth at
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the three-digit SIC manufacturing industry level. 1 test the hypothesis that 
diversification o f  chaebols has a negative impact on the level and growth o f  industry 
productivity. In order to investigate the chaebol effect on industry productivity growth, 
1 measure the degree o f diversification o f chaebols using traditional diversification 
indices and find that chaebols are highly diversified. However, while chaebol 
diversification increased markedly from 1986 to 1996, it fell sharply after the financial 
crisis.
The regression analysis shows that chaebol diversification is negatively related 
to the level o f productivity and productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors. This 
is true whether one examines total factor productivity and its growth or labor 
productivity and its growth. The findings are also consistent across a range o f 
specifications. Alternatively, the share o f  chaebol in an industry does not affect 
productivity.
Overall the results are consistent with the findings o f  those o f  Lichtenberg 
(1992) and Gollop (1997) which report on the relationship between industrial 
diversification and TFP in the US and Lee and Han (1998) that examines firm-level 
profitability for the 30 largest Korean chaebols. These studies show the negative 
relationship between diversification and firm performance. Alternatively, the results are 
quite different than that o f Chang and Choi ( 1988) that showed a positive relationship 
between chaebol diversification and profits during 1975-1984 period. Note, however, 
that the period understudy in Chang and Choi precedes the period o f study here. The 
bottom line o f  my study is that higher levels o f chaebol diversification are negatively 
correlated with industry performance.
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Table 5.1. Sample Information and Basic Statistics
Sample Periods: 1988, 1993, and 1998
Number o f  Manufacturing Industries 61
In All Industries
Number o f Chaebols, i.e., the largest Korean business groups 70
Number o f chaebol firms, i.e., the affiliated firms o f chaebols 1024
Average number o f chaebol firms o f each chaebol 14.63
(10.33)
Average number o f  industries in which each chaebol is engaged 7.74
(5.44)
In The Manufacturing Industries
Total number o f manufacturing industries engaged by the chaebols 48
Number o f  chaebol firms 459
Average number o f firms o f each chaebol 6.96
(4.90)
Average number o f  manufacturing industries in which each 3J8
chaebol is engaged (2.57)
Observations in Analysis*
Number o f chaebol finns in Analysis
Average number o f finns o f  each chaebol in manufacturing after 
eliminating missing-data firms
Average number o f manufacturing industries in which each 
chaebol is engaged after eliminating missing-data finns
420
6 . 1 2
(4.77)
3.51
(2.40)
Note that three large state-own chaebols are excluded for chaebol finns.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
* After eliminating either firms that do not have any financial information or firms that 
do not have infonnation for variables for measuring the diversification index.
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Table 5.2. Average Diversification Index for the 70 Chaebols with T raditional 
Indices
Y ear 1/N H erfindahl (HD) Entropy (E)
1986 0.22119 0.36859 0.70001
1987 0.21765 0.37433 0.71659
1988 0.21664 0.39766 0.75852
1989 0.21664 0.39405 0.76268
1990 0.20214 0.39900 0.77717
1991 0.20321 0.41214 0.80493
1992 0.19272 0.42084 0.82786
1993 0.18136 0.42679 0.84660
1994 0.16633 0.45453 0.91891
1995 0.15350 0.48034 0.98186
1996 0.13012 0.51240 1.05756
1997 0.16572 0.47753 0.96889
1998 0.18946 0.41720 0.83698
1999 0.18267 0.40392 0.83609
2 0 0 0 0.18724 0.39282 0.80047
Note; N is the number o f  industries at the two-digit SIC level in which chaebols are 
engaged.
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Table 5.3. The Measurement of the CD index and Share
Industry
1988 1993 1998
CD S CD S CD S
Average for all manufacturing 0.58 0 . 2 0 0.58 0.23 0.55 0 .2 1
Food & Beverages 0.49 0.30 0.53 0.35 0.50 0.32
Textiles 0.54 0.05 0.57 0.06 038 0.06
Coke, refined petroleum & nuclear fuel 0.70 0.56 0.73 0.85 0.73 0.82
Chemicals 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.45
Other Non-metallic Mineral 0.45 0.23 0.50 0.23 0.47 0.28
Basic Metals 0.47 0 .2 1 0.54 0.24 0.49 0 . 2 2
Computers & Office Machinery 0.48 0 .2 1 0.46 0.19 0.49 0.13
Electrical Machinery &62 0.15 0.65 0.29 0.60 0.19
Electronic Communication Equipment 0.61 0.31 0.65 0.53 0.61 0.46
Motor Vehicles, Trailers & semitrailers 0.58 0.45 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.63
Other Transport Equipment 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.60 0.72 0.51
Note that CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor input share o f 
chaebols respectively.
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Table 5.4. Sum m ary Statistics on TFP and TFP G row th 
Panel A
Variables Industry Chaebol firm
Observation Mean Observation Mean
Log o f  value- 
added
1228 11.334
(1.634)
794 12.099
(1.833)
Log o f capital 1228 11.162
(1.830)
794 10.572
(2.108)
Log o f labor 1228 8.070
(1.324)
794 6.516
(1.5442)
Panel B
Size Class Obs. AlnTFP AlnADTFP
Overall Mean 777 0.068 (0.418) 0.069 (0.421)
Worker 5-9 109 0.068 (0.389) 0.073 (0.391)
Worker 10-19 1 1 0 0.104 (0.363) 0.107 (0.363)
Worker 20-49 111 0.066 (0.289) 0.068 (0.287)
Worker 50-99 104 0.084 (0.326) 0.086 (0.327)
Worker 100-199 97 0.049 (0.390) 0.050 (0.392)
Worker 200-299 85 0.050 (0.518) 0.051 (0.524)
Worker 300-499 76 0.013 (0.592) 0.013 (0.579)
Worker 500 & more 85 0.086 (0.499) 0.086 (0.501)
Note that standard deviations are 
AlnADTFP is the InTFP growth 
hours worked.
in parenthesis. AlnTFP is the simple growth of InTFP. 
measured by the adjusted labor inputs weighted by
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Table 5.5. Chaebol Diversification and Industry TFP
Independent Dependent Variable: InTFP
variables ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 0.1328 -0.1971 * * 0.1290 0.0444
Sizel
(0.0963)
0.1054 * *
(0.0392)
0.1054 * *
(0.0988)
0.1054 * *
(0.1146)
0.1053 * *
Size2
(0.0387)
0.1420 * *
(0.0390)
0.1422 * *
(0.0387)
0.1420 * *
(0.0387)
0.1419
Size]
(0.0386)
0.2675 **
(0.0388)
0.2677 * *
(0.0386)
0.2675 * *
(0.0386)
0.2675 * *
Size4
(0.0387)
0.2566 * *
(0.0389)
0.2575 * *
(0.0387)
0.2567 * *
(0.0387)
0.2567 **
Size5
(0.0396)
0.3103 **
(0.0399)
0.3118 **
(0.0396)
0.3105 * *
(0.0396)
0.3108 * *
Sized
(0.0402)
0.2495 * *
(0.0404)
0.2513 * *
(0.0402)
0.2497 * *
(0.0402)
0.2502 * *
Size?
(0.0405)
0.2004 **
(0.0408)
0.2013 * *
(0.0406)
0.2005 * *
(0.0405)
0.2009 * *
CD
(0.0398)
-0.5778 **
(0.0400) (0.0398)
-0.5796 **
(0.0398)
-0.4631 **
S
(0.1610)
-0.0065
(0.1614)
0.0195
(0.1802)
0.8163
CD*S
(0.1129) (0.1124) (0.5603)
-1.1777
(0.8114)
Adj.R2 0.2926 0.2833 0.2919 0.2927
Observation 1033 1033 1033 1033
F test 8.29 7.93 8.28 8.13
** denotes 99% significance. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
diversification index and the labor share respectively. CD*S is 
multiplied by the share.
. CD and S denote the 
the diversification
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Table 5.6. Chaebol Diversification and Industry TFP with Year Controls
Independent Dependent Varia )le: InTFP
variables ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0117 -0.2187 * * 0.0039 -0.0170
Sizel
(0.0978)
0.1054 * *
(0.0397)
0.1054 * *
(0.1003)
0.1053 * *
(0.1145)
0.1053 * *
Size2
(0.0382)
0.1427 * *
(0.0383)
0.1429 * *
(0.0382)
0.1427 * *
(0.0382)
0.1427 * *
Size3
(0.0381)
0.2676 * *
(0.0382)
0.2677 * *
(0.0381)
0.2676 * *
(0.0381)
0.2676 * *
Size4
(0.0382)
0.2592 * *
(0.0383)
0.2603 * *
(0.0382)
0.2595 * *
(0.0382)
0.2595 * *
SizeS
(0.0391)
0.3125 * *
(0.0392)
0.3140 * *
(0.0391)
0.3129 **
(0.0391)
0.3129 * *
Size6
(0.0396)
0.2541 * *
(0.0397)
0.2559 * *
(0.0397)
0.2545 * *
(0.0397)
0.2546 * *
Size?
(0.0400)
0.2064 * *
(0.0401)
0.2075 * *
(0.0400)
0.2066 * *
(0.0400)
0.2067 * *
Year93
(0.0393)
-0.0424
(0.0394)
-0.0540 *
(0.0393)
-0.0441
(0.0393)
-0.0413
Year98
(0.0243)
0.0887 **
(0.0244)
0.0914 * *
(0.0247)
0.0877 * *
(0.0258)
0.0880 * *
CD
(0.0246)
-0.3939 *
(0.0248) (0.0248)
-0.3960 *
(0.0248)
-0.3686 *
S
(0.1636)
0.0306
(0.1638)
0.0403
(0.1789)
0.2550
CD*S
(0.1133) (0.1131) (0.5753)
-0.3208
(0.8428)
Adj.R2 0.3113 0.3072 0.3106 0.3100
Observation 1033 1033 1033 1033
F test 8.45 8.27 843 8.19
** and * denote 99% and 95% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor share respectively. 
CD*S is the diversification multiplied by the share.
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Table 5.7. Chaebol Diversification and Industry TFP Growth
Independent Dependent Variable: InTFP Growth
variables ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4 )
Constant 0.7596 ** 0.0506 0.7472 ** 0.7370 **
(0.1571) (0.0671) (0.1611) (0.1890)
Sizel 0.0321 0.0318 0.0321 0.0321
(0.0588) (0.0599) (0.0588) (0.0589)
Size2 0.0071 0.0069 0.0071 0.0071
(0.0585) (0.0596) (0.0586) (0.0586)
SizeS 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057
(0.0586) (0.0597) (0.0587) (0.0587)
Size4 -0.0003 -0.0015 0 .0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1
(0.0605) (0.0616) (0.0605) (0.0606)
SizeS 0.0004 0.0018 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0621) (0.0633) (0.0622) (0.0623)
Sized -0.0095 -0.0098 -0.0090 -0.0089
(0.0629) (0.0640) (0.0629) (0.0630)
Size? 0.0519 0.0486 0.0523 0.0523
(0.0616) (0.0628) (0.0617) (0.0618)
CD -1.2443 ** -1.2543 ** -1.2404 **
(0.2630) (0.2647) (0.2972)
S -0.0312 0.0712 0.1638
(0.2039) (0.2016) (0.9168)
CD*S -0.1342
(1.2971)
Adj.R2 0.0705 0.0367 0.0692 0.0677
Observation 670 670 670 670
F test 1.89 1 . 6 8 1.87 1 .8 6
** denotes 99% significance. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
diversification index and the labor share respectively. CD*S is 
multiplied by the share.
, CD and S denote the 
the diversification
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Table 5.8. Chaebol Diversification and Industry TFP Growth with Year Controls
Independent Dependent Variable: InTFP Growlh
variables ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 0.4264 ** -0.0843 0.3976 * 0J%33 **
(0.1655) (0.0680) (0.1700) (0.1876)
Sizel 0.0318 0.0316 0.0318 0.0319
(0.0575) (0.0579) (0.0575) (0.0574)
Size2 0.0074 0.0075 0.0074 0.0074
(0.0572) (0.0576) (0.0572) (0.0571)
SizeS 0.0067 0.0068 0.0067 0.0068
(0.0573) (0.0577) (0.0573) (0.0572)
Size4 0.0027 0.0032 0.0037 0.0043
(0.0591) (0.0596) (0.0591) (0.0591)
SizeS 0.0031 0.0054 0.0043 0.0043
(0.0608) (0.0612) (0.0608) (0.0607)
Size6 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0036 0.0023 0.0025
(0.0615) (0.0619) (0.0615) (0.0614)
Size? 0.0609 0.0613 0.0621 0.0631
(0.0603) (0.0608) (0.0603) (0.0602)
Year 98 0.1720 ** 0.2019 ** 0.1738 ** 0.1919 **
(0.0317) (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0335)
CD -0.8156 ** -0.8324 ** -1.0252 **
(0.2690) (0.2700) (0.2922)
S 0.1016 0.1512 -1.4128
(0.1983) (0.1975) (0.9353)
CD*S 2.2805
(1.3331)
Adj.R2 0.1115 0.1741 0.1109 0.1137
Observation 670 670 670 670
F test 1.87 L88 1 . 8 6 1.91
** denotes 99% significance. Standard errors are in parenthesis. CD and S denote the 
diversification index and the labor share respectively. CD*S is the diversification 
multiplied by the share.
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Table 5.9. Chaebol Diversification and Industry Labor Productivity
Independent Dependent Variable: the log o f labor productivity
variables ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4 )
Constant 1.1904 * * 0.8741 * * 1.1879 * * 1.1124 * *
Sizel
(0.1007)
0.1281 * *
(0.0457)
0.1282 * *
(0.1023)
0.1281 * *
(0.1188)
0.1281 * *
Size2
(0.0388)
0.1941 * *
(0.0390)
0.1942 * *
(0.0388)
0.1941 * *
(0.0388)
0.1939 * *
Size3
(0.0387)
0.3111 * *
(0.0389)
0.3110 * *
(0.0387)
0.3111 * *
(0.0387)
0.3108 * *
Size4
(0.0388)
0.3079 * *
(0.0390)
0.3084 * *
(0.0388)
0.3082 * *
(0.0388)
0.3077 9jC ZjC
SizeS
(0.0400)
0.3374 **
(0.0403)
0.3383 * *
(0.0401)
0.3376 * *
(0.0400)
0.3374 * *
Sized
(0.0406)
0.2831 * *
(0.0409)
0.2843 zK %
(0.0407)
0.2835 * *
(0.0406)
0.2833 * *
Size?
(0.0411)
0.2982 * *
(0.0414)
0.2983 **
(0.0412)
0.2985 * *
(0.0412)
0.2979 * *
ln(K/L)
(0.0409)
0.6982 **
(0.0412)
0.6990 **
(0.0409)
0.6980 * *
(0.0409)
0.6989 **
CD
(0.0097)
-0.5518 **
(0.0099) (0.0098)
-0.5534 * *
(0.0098)
-0.4522 *
S
(0.1612)
-0.0105
(0.1617)
0.0161
(0.1808)
0.7036
CD*S
(0.1141) (0.1138) (0.5618)
-1.0184
(0.8150)
Adj.R2 0.8813 0.8799 0.8812 0.8812
Observation 1033 1033 1033 1033
F test 6.64 6 3 2 &63 6.57
** and * denote 99% and 95% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor share respectively. 
CD*S is the diversification multiplied by the share.
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Table 5.10. Chaebol Diversification and Industry Labor Productivity with Year
Controls
Independent Dependent Varia )le: the log o f labor productivity
variables ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 1.5784 ** 1.3568 ** 1.5716 ** 1.5460 **
Sizel
(0.0935)
0.1263 **
(0.0490)
0.1264 **
(0.0954)
0.1263 **
(0.1072)
0.1263 **
Size2
(0.0339)
0.2411 **
(0.0340)
0.2412 **
(0.0339)
0.2411 **
(0.0339)
0.2411 **
Size]
(0.0339)
0.4218 **
(0.0340)
0.4218 **
(0.0339)
0.4218 **
(0.0339)
0.4218 **
Size4
(0.0346)
0.5261 **
(0.0347)
0.5271 **
(0.0346)
0.5265 **
(0.0346)
0.5265 **
SizeS
(0.0373)
0.5566 **
(0.0374)
0.5579 **
(0.0373)
0.5570 **
(0.0373)
0.5570 **
Size6
(0.0378)
0.5641 **
(0.0380)
0.5658 **
(0.0378)
0.5647 **
(0.0379)
0.5648 **
Size7
(0.0396)
0.6951 **
(0.0398)
0.6961 **
(0.0397)
0.6956 **
(0.0397)
0.6957 **
ln(K/L)
(0.0428)
0.3366 **
(0.0430)
0.3367 **
(0.0429)
0.3364 **
(0.0429)
0.3364 **
Year93
(0.0232)
0.5216 **
(0.0233)
0.5104 **
(0.0232)
0.5205 **
(0.0232)
0.5239 **
Year98
(0.0398)
1.0016 **
(0.0399)
1.0040 **
(0.0400)
1 . 0 0 1 2 **
(0.0405)
1.0016 **
CD
(0.0589)
-0.3791 **
(0.0591) (0.0590)
-0.3810 **
(0.0590)
-0.3476 *
S
(0.1452)
0.0274
(0.1453)
0.0367
(0.1587)
0.2985
CD*S
(0.1006) (0.1004) (0.5105)
-0.3910
(0.7478)
Adj.R2 0.9092 0.9086 0.9092 0.9091
Observation 1033 1033 1033 1033
F test 8.72 7.66 7.81 7.81
** and * denote 99% and 95% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor share respectively. 
CD*S is the diversification multiplied by the share.
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Table 5.11. Chaebol Diversification and Industry Labor Productivity Growth
Independent Dependent Varia île: the growth o f the log o f labor productivity
variables ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 0.8485 ** 0.5807 ** 0.8136 ** 0.9490 **
(0.1209) (0.0561) (0.1238) (0.1451)
Sizel 0.0523 0.0528 0.0524 0.0527
(0.0452) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0451)
Size2 0.0445 0.0456 0.0446 0.0450
(0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0450) (0.0450)
SizeS 0.0444 0.0456 0.0446 0.0451
(0.0452) (0.0453) (0.0451) (0.0451)
Size4 0.0562 0.0585 0.0576 0.0584
(0.0466) (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0465)
SizeS 0.0781 0.0821 0.0799 0.0803
(0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0479)
Size6 0.0561 0.0594 0.0579 0.0578
(0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0484)
Size? 0.1131 * 0.1154 * 0.1148 * 0.1156 *
(0.0476) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0475)
dln(K/L) 0.2059 ** 0.1942 ** 0.2042 ** 0 . 2 0 0 2  **
(0.0254) (0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0255)
CD -0.4107 * -0.4366 * -0.6150 **
(0.2061) (0.2070) (0.2296)
S 0.1713 0.2026 - 1 . 0 2 1 0
(0.1547) (0.1550) (0.7043)
CD*S 1.7765
(0.9976)
Adj.R2 0.2035 0.1999 0.2044 0.2072
Observation 670 670 670 670
F test 2 . 6 8 2.80 2 . 6 8 2.75
** and * denote 99% and 95% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor share respectively. 
CD*S is the diversification multiplied by the share. dln(K/L) is the growth of the log of 
the ratio o f capital to labor.
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Table 5.12. Chaebol Diversification and Industry Labor Productivity Growth with
Year Controls
Independent Dependent Variable: the growth of the log o f labor productivity
variables ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 1.1477 ** 0.7324 ** 1.1169 ** 1.1290 **
(0.1319) (0.0650) (0.1352) (0.1475)
Sizel 0.0569 0.0569 0.0569 0.0569
(0.0443) (0.0447) (0.0443) (0.0444)
Size2 0.0521 0.0525 0.0522 0.0521
(0.0442) (0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0442)
SizeS 0.0520 0.0525 0.0520 0.0520
(0.0443) (0.0446) (0.0443) (0.0443)
Size4 0.0648 0.0660 0.0659 0.0658
(0.0457) (0.0461) (0.0457) (0.0458)
Size5 0.0903 0.0931 0.0916 0.0915
(0.0471) (0.0475) (0.0471) (0.0472)
Sized 0.0606 0.0636 0.0620 0.0619
(0.0476) (0.0479) (0.0476) (0.0476)
Size? 0.1195 * 0.1207 * 0.1207 * 0.1208 *
(0.0467) (0.0470) (0.0467) (0.0467)
dln(K/L) 0.1274 ** 0.1232 ** 0.1269 ** 0.1275 **
(0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0293)
Year98 -0.1478 ** -0.1253 ** -0.1461 ** -0.1441 **
(0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0287) (0.0303)
CD -0.6562 ** -0.6738 ** -0.6920 **
(0.2075) (0.2082) (0.2262)
S 0.1197 0.1594 0.0129
(0.1529) (0.1522) (0.7255)
CD*S 0.2135
(1.0339)
Adj.R2 0.2354 0.2237 0.2355 0.2343
Observation 670 670 670 670
F test 2.85 2 . 8 6 283 283
** and * denote 99% and 95% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. CD and S denote the diversification index and the labor share respectively. 
CD*S is the diversification multiplied by the share. dln(K/L) is the growth o f the log o f 
the ratio o f capital to labor.
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Table 5.1.A. Chaebol Diversification and Industry TFP Growth (adjusted by hours
Independent Dependent Variable; InTFP Growth
variables ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
Constant 0.4394 ** -0.0821 0.4063 * 0.5547 **
(0.1666) (0.0685) (0.1712) (& I8 8 8 )
Sizel 0.0298 0.0296 0.0298 0.0299
(0.0579) (0.0583) (0.0579) (0.0578)
Size2 0.0043 0.0042 0.0043 0.0043
(0.0576) (0.0580) (0.0576) (0.0575)
SizeS 0.0032 0.0033 0.0032 0.0033
(0.0577) (0.0581) (0.0577) (0.0576)
Size4 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003
(0.0595) (0.0600) (0.0596) (0.0594)
SizeS -0.0009 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0612) (0.0616) (0.0612) (0.0611)
Sized -0.0037 -0 . 0 0 1 0 -0.0023 -0 . 0 0 2 1
(0.0619) (0.0624) (0.0619) (0.0618)
Size? 0.0544 0.0549 0.0556 0.0568
(0.0607) (0.0612) (0.0607) (0.0606)
Year 98 0.1693 ** 0.1998 ** 0.1713 ** 0.1910 **
(0.0319) (0.0309) (0.0320) (0.0337)
CD -0.8265 ** -0.8452 ** -1.0547 **
(0.2709) (0.2719) (0.2941)
S 0.1181 0.1684 -1.5303
(0.1996) (0.1989) (0.9413)
CD*S 2.4769
(1.3417)
Adj.R2 0.1042 0.0911 0.1038 0.1073
Observation 670 670 670 670
F test 1.75 1.78 1.75 1.80
** denotes 99% significance. Standard errors are in parenthesis. CD and S denote the 
diversification index and the labor share respectively. CD*S is the diversification 
multiplied by the share.
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Chapter 6.
Summary and Conclusions
6.1. Summary
Many economists have suggested theoretical and empirical rationales for 
corporate diversification across industries. These explanations have focused 
specifically on the different incentives for diversification and on the effect of 
diversification on performance. The Korean conglomerates, or chaebols, have a 
number o f unique characteristics with respect to their governance structure, their 
substantial roles in national economic development, their large size, and their special 
relationship with the government and the banks. This study described and analyzed the 
Korean chaebol diversification process and related performance, based on both 
theoretical and empirical models. By using chaebol-\Q\Q\ data and productivity data, 
the empirical analysis confirmed that chaebols diversified across various industries by 
increasing external debt. Also, it showed that chaebol diversification is, generally, 
negatively correlated with economic performance. These findings imply that chaebols, 
generally, are overdiversified and this overdiversification has a negative impact on 
economic performance.
In the fourth chapter, a testable theoretical model was developed to identify and 
investigate incentives for corporate diversification when the government plays a role in 
allocating capital to industrial firms. As discussed earlier, the Korean government 
manipulated capital allocation towards strategic sectors and large firms. As a result, 
these large finns expanded beyond the optimal profit maximizing level. By increasing 
their debt level through government-furnished policy loans, these finns increased their 
size and diversified into new areas o f business.
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Using conglomerate-level data from the 70 largest Korean finns, the empirical 
analysis revealed that Korean business groups became more diversified when they were 
externally financed. The relatively cheap external financing, as compared to the market 
capital price, that was available to chaebols also caused an increase in their level o f 
diversification. Furthennore, the analysis revealed that chaebols became less 
diversified in the period after the 1997 financial crisis, when the government reduced 
financial subsidies to them.
The fifth chapter examined the correlation between the level o f chaebol 
diversification and the level and growth o f total factor productivity in Korean 
manufacturing. This analysis suggested that the chaebols were highly diversified for 
the full sample period, even if  their diversification pattern varied across time. Before 
the 1997 crisis, chaebols were in the process o f  becoming more diversified. 
Subsequently, diversification declined. The regression analysis showed that high levels 
o f chaebol diversification were negatively associated with industry productivity and 
productivity growth. This finding is true for both TFP and labor productivity measures. 
Alternatively, the share o f  chaebols in an industry did not influence industry 
performance.
6.2. Limitations of This Study and Implications for Further Studies
This study has some limitations with respect to the collection o f available data 
for chaebol finns. The time series data are rather short, as systematic data have been 
available only since 1986. Thus, even though the chaebols emerged in the period 1940- 
50, and boomed in the period 1960-70, this study can only use obsciwations on chaebol 
finns after 1986. A more detailed examination o f the relationship between the chaebols
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and the Korean government requires data from the earlier industrialization period. This 
expansion o f the period under the study would lead to a clearer identification o f the role 
that government policies have played in the growth o f the chaebols.
Furthermore, even though the financial crisis o f 1997 brought some o f  the 
chaebols to bankruptcy, it also created new, large business groups. In this study, 
however, the new groups were excluded due to the unavailability and non-traetability o f 
the data. Future studies could investigate how the chaebols' structure changed after the 
1997 crisis, and how that crisis influenced chaebolhnàusXxy performance. These issues 
could be investigated using chaebol-\eve\ and industry-level production data from the 
existing chaebols before the crisis, and from the new chaebols that emerged after the 
crisis. Such studies could provide new insights into chaebol behavior and into how 
chaebol diversification changed post-erisis, and how this affected the economy 
generally.
6.3. Conclusions
Using both microeconomic data and industry-level data from Korea, this study 
provides evidence that industrial finns tend to diversify when government provides 
incentives to expand production; that is, when government provides finances on an 
exceptional basis to a limited number o f business entities, offering them relatively 
cheap capital costs in comparison to the market capital price. This process causes the 
finns to increase their debt beyond the optimal capacity level. The finns use the easy 
availability o f financial resources to overdiversify their business activities into other 
industries. This study confinns that chaebol overdiversification results in inefficiency 
and poor economic perfonnance. In the case o f  Korea, chaebols accumulated
83
considerable debts and operated inefficiently; many filed for bankruptcy before and 
during the 1997 crisis. This study also points to the Korean government's ineffective 
intervention in financial markets. In effect, the government promoted the misallocation 
of resources, which were skewed toward large, inefficient business groups. The 
chaebols need to eliminate inefficient business operations in order to improve their 
performance.
This study has made the following important contributions to diversification 
literature;
(1) A testable theoretical model that encompasses incentives for eorporate 
diversification, unlike other empirical data oriented studies. Many researchers 
have attempted to identify motivations for, and implications of, chaebol 
diversification, without a well-formalized framework.
(2) Confirmation o f recent research. Corporate diversification, in general, has a 
negative effect on firms’ perfonnance. This study supports this hypothesis.
(3) A timely empirical study of chaebol diversification in Korea, at a time when the 
government is looking to restructure chaebol groups in the wake o f the financial 
crisis o f 1997.
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